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In this issue, we present the latest American Judges Association whitepaper. Written by last year’s AJA president, Brian MacKenzie, the paperexplores the role of the judge in a drug-treatment court. Based on his own
experience as a drug-court judge and data from other studies, he argues that
the judge is the key to drug-court success and that the successful drug-court
judge must practice the principles of procedural fairness. MacKenzie’s paper
thus builds on the AJA’s first white paper—a 2007 paper on procedural fair-
ness. We hope you’ll take a look at MacKenzie’s paper as well as the past AJA
white papers (listed, with links to each paper, at page 35, immediately fol-
lowing the latest white paper).
Two related articles are included in the
issue. First, Nebraska judge Roger Heideman
and several researchers provide an in-depth
look at a Nebraska family court that has initi-
ated a drug-treatment track for parents in
cases in which parental rights might be termi-
nated. Drug treatment is one important way
some parents may be able to reunite with their
children, and the Nebraska court has set up a
mandatory drug-treatment track for some par-
ents—those in cases in which parental sub-
stance abuse is identified in the affidavit sup-
porting removal of a child from the parent’s
home. Judge Heideman and his coauthors present data on the first 42 families
to participate in this program and comment on the lessons that other courts
might learn from their experience.
Second, we have an article from judges Jamey Hueston and Kevin Burke;
both have served as drug-court judges. Together, they contend that many
drug-court concepts can be transferred to traditional court dockets. That’s
potentially a very important point—most cases are processed in general court
dockets, not in specialized dockets like a drug court or a mental-health court.
Both Judge Hueston and Judge Burke have many years of experience with
drug courts, and each has also worked more broadly on problem-solving
courts. We think you’ll be interested in their suggestions for how to use drug-
court concepts more broadly.
This issue also includes our new features—a law-related crossword puzzle
from Arkansas judge Vic Fleming and a column on Canadian law from Cana-
dian judge Wayne Gorman. In this issue, Gorman discusses both Canadian
and U.S. views on when a judge can go outside the record to do fact-related
research. You’ll find a useful review of American law on this topic in a past
Court Review article: John Monahan & Laurens Walker, A Judges’ Guide to
Using Social Science, 43 CT. REV. 156 (2007), available at
http://goo.gl/wRI2VU.—SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 7 of this
issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or
reject material submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Shelley Rockwell at (757) 259-1841.
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offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to Associa-
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I
n the last issue of Court Review, I challenged our members,
as Theodore Roosevelt challenged everyone in his speech,
“The Man in the Arena,” to “strive valiantly” to realize the
“triumph of high achievement” as you serve in the arena of
public service. In this issue, I’m asking those who can to take a
step back from the public arena and join your fellow AJA mem-
bers for our midyear conference in a historic, relaxing, and
beautiful setting: Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Those who do the hard work of judging know
all too well the toll stress takes on those who toil
in the “judicial arena.” Past President Brian
MacKenzie highlighted the importance of recog-
nizing and properly dealing with the health risks
inherent in our stressful occupation by dedicating
a column in Court Review (Vol. 51, Issue 1) and
last year’s midyear conference in Fort Meyers, Florida, to the
issue of “Judicial Stress.” The great programs presented at that
conference can be accessed through our website,
www.amjudges.org. 
At this year’s midyear conference in Santa Fe, April 19-22,
2016, we hope to provide the judges in attendance with some
much-needed “stress relief” by combining a top-notch educa-
tion program with some fun and relaxing activities to share
with your fellow judges from throughout the U.S. and Canada. 
If you want to learn how to handle guns safely and profes-
sionally, especially how to properly handle guns as evidence in
a court proceeding, our own Judges Gene Lucci and Richard
Kayne will offer an optional tutorial on gun safety. An optional
trip to a local gun range following the tutorial is in the planning
stages.  
In addition to the optional tutorial on gun safety, we have
made room in our schedule for at least one afternoon for you
to relax with colleagues. If fly fishing is your way to relax,
expert guides are available to take you on a scenic trip to one
of New Mexico’s finest trout streams. You may schedule your
trip through www.thereellife.com or through any of a number
of area guide services.
Santa Fe has many beautiful museums and
historic buildings to tour, and we will furnish a
tour guide familiar with the area to help you
select from a variety of options as you plan your
personal tour following our education programs.
Senior United States District Judge James Parker
is also offering a guided tour of the historic Santa
Fe Federal Courthouse. 
So please invest a few minutes of your time now to visit our
website and register for our Santa Fe Midyear meeting:
http://www.am judges.org/conferences/. We have a room block
at The Drury Plaza Hotel in beautiful downtown Santa Fe,
within walking distance of many historic points of interest and
museums.
As Will Rogers famously said: “Half our life is spent trying
to find something to do with the time we have rushed through
life trying to save.” So spend a little time with AJA in Santa Fe
and refresh your mind and your spirit from the rigors and stress
of public life as a judge. Then return to your “judicial arena”
with renewed vigor to pursue the “triumph of high achieve-
ment” in your courtrooms!
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It is generally accepted that judges can conduct researchbeyond the materials provided by counsel. One cannotargue, for instance, that we are limited to case precedents
submitted by counsel or that we cannot conduct our own legal
research.1 However, what if the research is not of a strictly legal
nature? What if we are not satisfied with the evidence pre-
sented? How far can we go in examining exhibits and drawing
conclusions from them? These are different and more difficult
questions that have caused debate in Canada and the United
States because in “an accusatory and adversarial system, the
delicate task of bringing the truth to light falls first and fore-
most to the parties.”2 As will be seen, in certain instances,
independent research or examination of exhibits can both raise
a reasonable apprehension of bias and prevent an accused per-
son from making full answer and defence.
EXAMINATION OF EXHIBITS
When an exhibit is entered, we can examine it. No doubt we
can draw inferences from the exhibit.3 A “trial judge is not a
mere observer in a criminal trial.”4 However, how far can we
go in such examinations before we become a witness?
An interesting illustration of this point can be found in the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Nikolovski.5 In
Nikolovski, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a conviction
for robbery based solely on the trial judge’s comparison of the
person depicted in a crime-in-progress video with the accused
who was sitting in the courtroom. There was no other identifi-
cation evidence, and the store clerk was unable to identify the
accused. The majority of the Supreme Court held that “it was
certainly open to the trial judge to conclude that the accused
before her was the person depicted on the tape.”6 However,
two dissenting justices suggested that “the difficulty with the
majority’s reasoning is that the judge’s observations [were]
entirely untested by cross-examination.”7 Applying Nikolovski,
it was held in R. v. Benson that a conviction should be upheld
though the trial judge “relied on the recognition evidence of
the complainant and his own supporting observations in mak-
ing his decision on the appellant’s guilt.”8 Similarly, in R. v.
Gyles, it was held that in convicting the accused, the trial judge
properly “relied on her comparison of the appellant’s voice
when he testified in court with the voice heard on the tape
recording [entered as an exhibit] in coming to her conclusion
that it was the appellant’s voice on the tape recording.”9
An example of a trial judge going too far in examining
exhibits can be found in R. v. Bornyk.10 In Bornyk, the accused
was charged with the offence of break and entry. The key evi-
dence against him was a fingerprint found inside the house.
The Crown called an expert fingerprint examiner, who testified
that the fingerprint had been deposited in the house by the
accused. After reserving judgment, the trial judge sent counsel
four articles critical of the accuracy of fingerprint analysis. After
hearing further submissions, the trial judge entered an acquit-
tal. In doing so he referred to the articles he had produced and
his own comparison of the known print with the latent print.
The Crown appealed from the acquittal.  The appeal raised
two issues:
(1) whether the trial judge erred “in relying upon inde-
pendently researched literature that was not properly
introduced by either party, not tested in evidence, and
not put to the fingerprint witness”; and 
(2) whether the trial judge erred “by engaging in his
own unguided comparison of the latent print and
known print.”11
The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal noted that it “is basic to trial work
that a judge may only rely upon the evidence presented at trial,
except where judicial notice may be taken.”12 The Court of
Appeal indicated that it was “apparent from the excerpts found
in the reasons for judgment and the descriptive titles of the
articles uncovered by the judge that the articles are discussions
on the subject of fingerprint analysis, including opinion. As
articles commenting on forensic science, their contents are not
matters of which the judge could take judicial notice. It is thus
axiomatic that it was not open to the judge to embark on his
independent investigation.”13
THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN
How Much Independent Judicial
Research Is Appropriate?
Wayne K. Gorman
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The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge “stepped
beyond his proper neutral role and into the fray. In doing so, he
compromised the appearance of judicial independence essential
to a fair trial. While he sought submissions on the material he
had located, by the very act of his self-directed research, in the
words of Justice Doherty in R. v. Hamilton (2004), 189 O.A.C.
90, 241 D.L.R. (4th) 490 at para. 71, he assumed the multi-
faceted role of ‘advocate, witness and judge.’”14
The Court of Appeal also concluded that the trial judge
erred in “conducting his own analysis of the fingerprints”:
[T]he judge also erred by conducting his own analysis of
the fingerprints, absent the assistance of the expert wit-
ness. The very point of having an expert witness in a
technical area, here fingerprint analysis, is that the spe-
cialized field requires elucidation in order for the court
to form a correct judgment: Kelliher (Village) v. Smith,
[1931] S.C.R. 672; R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 114
D.L.R. (4th) 419. While it may be desirable that a judge
personally observe the similarities and differences
between the latent point and known point, such exami-
nation should be guided by a witness so as to avoid the
trier of fact forming a view contrary to an explanation
that may be available if only the chance were provided
to proffer it.15
A recent example from New Zealand constitutes another
example of a judge going too far. In Garrett-Phillips v. R., the
accused pleaded guilty to a charge of wounding with intent to
cause grievous bodily harm.16 The accused had stabbed the
victim at a tavern and used a knife he had brought to the tav-
ern with him. At the sentence hearing, evidence was presented
to refute the suggestion that the stabbing had been premedi-
tated. This evidence indicated that, earlier in the day, the
accused had been paua fishing at Opunake, that the knife he
had with him at the tavern had been used for paua shucking,
and that, as he had not changed his clothes afterwards, that
knife was still in his pocket when he went to the tavern. 
The sentencing judge rejected this evidence. One of the
grounds upon which he did so was that he had personally
“consulted tide charts for Opunake on the day in question.”
The sentencing judge concluded based upon his assessment of
the charts that “the alleged paua fishing would have occurred
at full-tide. The judge did not, therefore, accept that Garrett-
Phillips would have been wearing the same clothes in the tav-
ern as he had worn whilst fishing for paua. Further, the judge
did not consider the knife to be the sort of knife that would be
used for paua fishing.
On appeal, the New Zealand Court of Appeal upheld the
sentence imposed but indicated that “it was unwise of the
Judge to have consulted factual material that was not in evi-
dence before him.”17
But how far should such restrictions go? Surely we are not
limited solely to judicial notice. Can we not use our experience
and knowledge of local conditions without evidence having
been presented? Consider the decision in R. v. Smarch.18 In
Smarch, the accused was convicted of the offence of sexual
assault. The trial judge refused to impose a “long term super-
vision order” because he concluded “that suitable, high-inten-
sity treatment programs were not available in the Yukon.”19
The Yukon Court of Appeal held that the foundation for the
sentence was based “on an absence of evidence, which is an
error in law. There was no evidence before the judge regarding
programs that could adequately supervise Mr. Smarch in the
community; rather, the judge based his conclusion that such
programs were available on his own knowledge and experi-
ence. This is not enough.”20
So it would appear that though we can view exhibited video
tapes or photographs and reach our own conclusions without
becoming “advocate, witness and judge,” we must be cautious
in examining other types of evidence. The line of demarcation
appears to involve, in part, whether expert explanation of the
relevance and meaning of the evidence is necessary and
whether it requires an examination that might be impacted by
cross-examination. 
THE INTERNET
The Internet allows for an unprecedented ease of worldwide
legal research. However, it also allows for non-legal research,
and this is where judges can fall into error.
An example can be found in R. v. C.D.H.21 In C.D.H., the
accused was acquitted of the offence of sexual assault. The trial
judge had conducted his own Internet research on the website
“Match.com” after it had been referred to in the evidence. The
Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s conduct
contravened the “basic principle that judges and jurors must
make their judicial decisions based only on the evidence pre-
sented in court on the record.”22
The Ontario Court of Appeal also concluded “that the cir-
cumstances we have outlined gave rise to a reasonable appre-
hension of bias.”23
In the United States, the decision in Rowe v. Gibson24 nicely
illustrates the problem because of the existence of a dissent.
In Rowe, a prisoner sued a prison and its staff in relation to
medical treatment. The suit was dismissed but reversed on
appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The nature of the disagreement between the judges
was described by one of the judges as follows:
A disagreement about the outcome of this relatively sim-
ple case has morphed into a debate over the propriety of
appellate courts supplementing the record with Internet
research.25
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In an opinion dissenting in part, Judge David F. Hamilton
took umbrage at his colleagues’ use of the Internet:
The ease of research on the internet has given new life
to an old debate about the propriety of and limits to
independent factual research by appellate courts. . . .
The majority’s approach turns the court from a neutral
decision-maker into an advocate for one side. The
majority also offers no meaningful guidance as to how it
expects other judges to carry out such factual research
and what standards should apply when they do so.
Under the majority’s approach, the factual record will
never be truly closed. This invites endless expansion of
the record and repetition in litigation as parties contend
and decide that more and more information should have
been considered.26
However, Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the majority,
suggested that modern trial judges are not “like the English
judges of yore”:
In citing even highly reputable medical websites in sup-
port of our conclusion that summary judgment was pre-
mature we may be thought to be “going outside the
record” in an improper sense. It may be said that judges
should confine their role to choosing between the evi-
dentiary presentations of the opposing parties, much
like referees of athletic events. But judges and their law
clerks often conduct research on cases, and it is not
always research confined to pure issues of law, without
disclosure to the parties. We are not like the English
judges of yore, who under the rule of “orality” were not
permitted to have law clerks or other staff, or libraries,
or even to deliberate—at the end of the oral argument in
an appeal the judges would state their views seriatim as
to the proper outcome of the appeal.27
CONCLUSION
The decision in Smarch might have been different if the trial
judge had raised his concern about a lack of treatment pro-
grams and asked for submissions or evidence. In R. v. Turpin,
for instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that if a trial
judge, in examining an exhibit, concludes it contradicts viva
voce evidence on a point not raised, the trial judge should
“advise the parties and offer an opportunity to have the trial re-
opened.”28 Such an approach might generally be wise. A crim-
inal trial is after all not really a search for the truth. It consti-
tutes “an independent testing of facts to the required legal
standard in order to determine if facts have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.”29
Though a request for further submissions based upon an
examination of presented evidence may answer the problem of
judges becoming their own witnesses, there appears to be no
answer to a judge becoming her or his own witness by exam-
ining such evidence as fingerprints. Similarly, the competing
views expressed by the judges in Rowe simply cannot be rec-
onciled. The majority opinion proposes a wide scope for judi-
cial evidence-gathering unencumbered by disclosure or the
benefits of advocacy. 
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely pub-
lished. His latest articles are The Impact of the Supreme Court
on Sentencing in Canada, 72 Supreme Court Law Review (Sec-
ond Series) 319 (2016), and Ours Is to Reason Why: The Law
of Rendering Judgment, 62 Criminal Law Quarterly 301
(2015). Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. For United States judges who
may want to read in full one of the Canadian decisions referred to
here, you can contact Judge Gorman and he will forward a copy to
you by email. 
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Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges Associa-
tion, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles, essays,
and book reviews.  Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful
information to the working judges of the United States and Canada.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new proce-
dures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing sub-
stantive information regarding an area of law likely to encountered
by many judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be used by
judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,000 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries.  About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general-jurisdiction, state trial
judges.  Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, includ-
ing municipal court and other specialized court judges.  The remain-
der include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges,
and administrative-law judges.
Articles: Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text with
footnotes in Microsoft Word format.  The suggested article length for
Court Review is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text
(including the footnotes).  Footnotes should conform to the current
edition of The Bluebook:  A Uniform System of Citation. Articles
should be of a quality consistent with better state-bar-association law
journals and/or other law reviews.
Essays: Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews: Book reviews should be submitted in the same for-
mat as articles.  Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of dou-
ble-spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment: For previously published authors, we will con-
sider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline.  In addition to the outline, a comment about the spe-
cific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreci-
ated.  Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a com-
pleted article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts.  
Submission: Submissions may be made either by mail or e-mail.
Please send them to Court Review’s editors:  Judge Steve Leben, 301
S.W. 10th Ave., Suite 278, Topeka, Kansas 66612, e-mail address:
sleben56@gmail.com; or Professor Eve Brank, Department of Psy-
chology, 334 Burnett Hall, PO Box 880308, Lincoln, NE 68588-
0308, e-mail address: ebrank2@unl.edu. Submissions will be
acknowledged by mail or e-mail; notice of acceptance or rejection
will be sent following review.
Court Review Author Submission Guidelines
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“I’ve learned that people will forget what you said, people
will forget what you did, but people will never forget how
you made them feel.”1
Beginning in the 1960s, the United States has suffered from waves of illicit drug epi-demics, which have exerted immense stress on our system of criminal justice.2 Fordecades, the governmental response has been to wage a “War on Drugs” that has
siphoned funding away from our nation’s schools and into the budgets of our correctional
systems.3 In spite of the considerable amount of taxpayer dollars that has been dedicated
to enforcement and incarceration initiatives, substance abuse remains a driving force in the
criminal-justice system.4 After five decades of inefficient spending and ineffective impris-
onment, governments at every level are realizing just how ineffective this “war” has been.5
While the rest of the nation slowly develops an understanding that our courts and judges
can become powerful motivators instead of intimidators, in 1989, Florida’s Eleventh Judi-
cial Circuit took a visionary step toward ending perpetual criminality for drug-dependent
defendants.6 By establishing the nation’s first drug-treatment court (DTC), the Eleventh
Circuit created a revolutionary system that’s built healthier communities, cut spending,
and changed how courts approach sentencing.7
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INTRODUCTION
The DTC methodology, which is based upon ten key components and best-practice stan-
dards, has since spread throughout the criminal-justice system to benefit other popula-
tions.8 The success of the DTC model has led to a series of specialty courts, such as vet-
erans’ treatment courts, that have realized newfound success in reducing recidivism
among their participants. 
In this paper, the American Judges Association (AJA) argues that, while programmatic
success requires adherence to best practices based upon the ten key components, ongo-
ing judicial interaction with drug-court participants based upon the four principles of
procedural fairness (voice, neutrality, respectful treatment, and trustworthy authorities)
is the most critical.9 After reviewing the mounting literature on the success of DTCs,
researchers have confidently concluded that the power of the judge-participant relation-
ship is so immense that it may have “effectively suppressed all other theoretical mecha-
nisms” that could potentially lead to desired outcomes.10
The developing understanding of the power of the judge-participant relationship led to a
2007 white paper published by the AJA titled Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Pub-
lic Satisfaction.11 The findings included in that paper demonstrated how the four princi-
ples of procedural fairness transformed individuals’ courtroom experiences, as well as the
general public’s perception of the judiciary. Current research has established that the suc-
cess of DTCs is dependent upon a judge’s adoption and use of the four principles of pro-
cedural fairness. 
Procedural fairness is the tool that drives the judge’s influence upon DTC participants.
This finding holds true regardless of a participant’s gender, race, age, or economic status.12
The research is quite clear that judges who adhere to the four principles of procedural
fairness achieve superior outcomes within their DTCs compared to judges who do not.13
While the AJA on behalf of its 2,000 member judges in the United States and Canada has
consistently recognized and supported the achievements of DTCs, the purpose of this
white paper is to identify and advocate for continued change that will improve the daily
work of these courts and the judges who preside over them. We believe that the baseline
social-science research underlying this paper is applicable not only in the U.S. and
Canada, but in any country using the DTC model.
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8. Id. at 3. These key components are:
1. Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug-treatment ser-
vices with justice-system case processing.
2. Using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense
counsel promote public safety while protecting participants’
due-process rights.
3. Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed
in the drug-court program. 
4. Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug,
and other related treatment and rehabilitation services. 
5. Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug
testing. 
6. A coordinated strategy governs drug-court responses to par-
ticipants’ compliance. 
7. Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug-court participant
is essential. 
8. Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of pro-
gram goals and gauge effectiveness. 
9. Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective
drug-court planning, implementation, and operations. 
10. Forging partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and
community-based organizations generates local support and
enhances drug-court-program effectiveness. 
NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, DRUG COURT STAN-
DARDS COMM., DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS, at iii
(1997, reprinted 2004).
9. NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, supra note 8, at 15. See
also Douglas B. Marlowe et al., The Judge Is a Key Component of
Drug Court, 4 DRUG CT. REV. 1, 26 (2004), http://www.ndcrc.org/
sites/default/files/dcr.iv2_.pdf.
10. SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., 4 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT
EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS 5 (2011).
11. Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness, A Key Ingredient
in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 4-5 (2007).
12. SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT
EVALUATION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2011).
13. Id.
14. NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, 1 ADULT DRUG COURT
BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS 3 (2013).
15. Caulkins & Reuter, supra note 2.
16. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 1985-1990, at 59;
http://www.dea.gov/about/history/1985-1990.pdf. 
17. Id. at 59-60; Caulkins & Reuter, supra note 2.
18. David B. Kopel, Crime: The Inner-City Crisis (2010),
http://www.davekopel.com/CJ/Mags/InnerCityCrisis.htm.
19. Ryan A. Kemper, U.S. Drug Control Policy: Clinging to an Outdated
Perspective, 10 RES PUBLICA 73, 79, 83 (2005).
20. Stuart Taylor, Jr., America’s Prison Spree Has Brutal Impact,
NATIONAL JOURNAL MAGAZINE, November 14, 2009.
21. Richard L. Berke, Cities Move to Curb Summer Crime Increase, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1989. 
22. Hora et al., supra note 6, at 455.
23. Types of Drug Courts, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PRO-
FESSIONALS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/
models.
24. About NADCP, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSION-
ALS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/about-nadcp.
25. See MARLOWE, supra note 7, at 3.
“The truth is that Drug Courts have always placed inordi-
nate demands on themselves. Dissatisfied with what was
currently being done and had always been done, Drug
Courts pushed through the envelope and redesigned the
criminal justice system.”14
By 1980, the use of powdered cocaine was widespread in the United States.15 An over-supply of powdered cocaine in the early 1980s led to the creation of crack cocaine.16Crack, being cheaper and easy to transport, spread like wildfire through the inner
cities of America.17 Violent crime, including murder, soared as a result of this new drug epi-
demic.18 In response to public safety concerns, harsh new drug laws were passed.19 The
resulting number of individuals arrested and imprisoned for drug-related crimes increased
elevenfold between 1980 and 1997, overwhelming both courts and correctional systems.20
In 1989, one of the cities struggling with this new criminal environment was Miami,
Florida. South Florida’s geography made it an ideal entry point for illicit drugs produced
in Central and South America, forcing Miami officials to prepare for another onslaught of
drug-related crime.21 Believing that Miami’s criminal-justice system was already overbur-
dened, Chief Judge Gerald Wetherington of Florida’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit issued an
administrative order creating the nation’s first drug court and appointed Judge Herbert
Klein to oversee its design and implementation.22
Out of that single court grew a new movement. Starting with inner-city courts and
expanding outward to suburban and rural communities, DTCs flourished.
As the number of DTCs grew, they began to evolve. The early courts focused on drug-
addicted adults charged with nonviolent felonies. Soon thereafter, DWI courts (also
known as sobriety courts) emerged, followed by juvenile drug courts, family dependency
courts, reentry courts, campus drug-treatment courts, and tribal drug-treatment courts.23
Each new court was born out of a unique response to a localized problem.
Pushing this growth at every stage was an organization founded in 1994 by the first
twelve drug courts: The National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP).24
The core philosophy of the NADCP was expressed in a set of principles known as the ten
key components of DTCs.25 Taken together, the components represented a new approach
to supervising defendants. Essential to the structure is a criminal-justice team led by a
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26. “75% of adult criminal Drug Court graduates never see another
pair of handcuffs.” Drug Courts Work, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/drug-
courts-work. See also STEVE AOS ET AL., WASHINGTON STATE INSTI-
TUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS TO
REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS,
AND CRIME RATES (2006); JEFF LATIMER ET AL., A META-ANALYTIC
EXAMINATION OF DRUG TREATMENT COURTS: DO THEY REDUCE
RECIDIVISM? (2006); Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Are Drug
Courts Effective: A Meta-Analytic Review, 15 J. COMMUNITY COR-
RECTIONS 5 (2005); DEBORAL KOETZEL SHAFFER, RECONSIDERING
DRUG COURT EFFECTIVENESS: A META-ANALYTIC REVIEW (2006);
David B. Wilson et al., A Systematic Review of Drug Court Effects
on Recidivism, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 459 (2006).
27. Marlowe et al., supra note 9, at 25.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Kevin Burke, Just What Made Drug Courts Successful? 36 NEW
ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 39, 54 (2010).
30. Id. at 57.
31. STEVEN BELENKO, NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE,
RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW, 2001 UPDATE 25
(2001).
32. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., FROM WHETHER TO HOW DRUG COURTS
WORK: RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION OF DRUG COURTS IN CLARK
COUNTY (LAS VEGAS) AND MULTNOMAH COUNTY (PORTLAND) 133
(2002).
33. Id. at 133.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 134.
judge and composed of a prosecutor, defense attorney, police officers, therapists, local
community victim advocates, and probation officers. When combined with mandatory
treatment, aggressive drug testing, regular review sessions, ongoing team training, com-
munity outreach, and a careful evaluation of outcomes, DTCs were able to reduce recidi-
vism rates significantly.26
One of the components, which calls for ongoing judicial interaction with each drug-court
participant, began to emerge in importance so as to be described by drug-court researchers
as a key component in DTCs.27 As these researchers correctly pointed out, however, they
were asserting this conclusion without detailed research on the impact of judicial interac-
tion with DTC participants.28 Nevertheless, there seemed to be an intuitive understanding
among drug-court judges that their relationship with the participants had a substantial
impact.29 According to Judge Kevin Burke, who was among those early drug-court judges: 
Many of the judges who engaged in the early generation of drug courts
were quite transparent and open in how decisions were made and they
gave explanations to the defendants as opposed to their lawyers. Their
orders were understandable to defendants.30
An early study of DTCs echoed Judge Burke’s sentiment: 
Nearly all the clients in Erie County (OH) agreed that the judge treated
them with respect (96%), was fair (93%), and was concerned about them
(86%). Three-quarters said that the court interactions with the judge
helped them to stay off drugs, as did regular court appearances.31
In a focus-group study in 2002, participants in six locations were asked about their expe-
riences in DTCs.32 In each location, participants’ responses indicated that the judge was
the most important influence in their success.33 Participants stressed the significance of
the individual attention they received from the judge and believed that their success mat-
tered to the judge.34 Participants indicated that without their relationship with the judge,
they would not have felt the need to comply with the many conditions of the program,
suggesting that the judge was the single most important element in their drug-court expe-
rience.35 This positive impact was further reflected in some of the excerpts from their
comments:36
• “She helps, she cares, she wants you to get your life together.”
• “Judge . . . is like a father figure in a sense . . . he seems to know your background,
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your kids, your name, I mean he knows a lot of details about you—he remembers what
he talked about with you last time.”
• “If you have one judge that oversees this program and she is constant then we all know
what to expect, but when you have a whole lot of judges coming in they don’t know
what you’ve been through or what’s really been happening with you.”
• “When you have one judge they are able to track what you are doing better . . . one is
better because you have a link . . . .”
• “When it is such a personal issue, it is nice to be recognized by someone. I think that
one judge is better because you already have a rapport built up with him.”
In 2004, an article in Drug Court Review, published by the National Drug Court Institute,
argued that there was a need for significantly more research into the impact of the judge
on successful participants in DTCs: “It is surprising . . . that little research has focused on
the role of the judge in drug court.”37 The authors acknowledged that participants indi-
cated repeatedly that their success was due to their relationship with the judge, while, at
the same time, stating: 
Although it is true that drug court clients commonly credit their success in
the program to their interactions with the judge . . . until very recently
there was no experimental evidence to indicate whether the judge is, in
fact, necessary or helpful to drug court outcomes.38
The evidence for this intuitive judicial understanding was later codified in The Drug Court
Judicial Benchbook.39 In the Benchbook, researchers for the drug-court movement sug-
gested that there are nine core competencies necessary for a judge to be successful in
operating a drug court.40
A close look at these core competencies highlights the key role that the drug-court judge
plays in the successful operation of these courts. While not described in terms of proce-
dural fairness, these core competencies create a circumstance where a judge is seen as
having legitimate authority. That sense of legitimacy is derived from the involvement and
preparation by the judge who provides a DTC participant with the subjective impression
that the process they’re undergoing is fair.
The uniform approach of the ten key components combined with the nine core compe-
tencies fueled the growth of DTCs. By 2007, there were 1,667 DTCs across all 50 states.41
37. Marlowe et al., supra note 9, at 4.
38. Id. at 4.
39. THE DRUG COURT JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK 47-61 (Douglas B. Marlowe
& William G. Meyer eds., 2011).
40. Id. at 47. These core competencies are:
1. Participates fully as a drug court team member, committing
him or herself to the program, mission and goals, and works
as a full partner to ensure their success.
2. As part of the drug court team, in appropriate non-court set-
tings (i.e., staffing), the judge advocates for effective incen-
tives and sanctions for program compliance or lack thereof.
3. Is knowledgeable of addiction, alcoholism, and pharmacology
generally and applies that knowledge to respond to compli-
ance in a therapeutically appropriate manner.
4. Is knowledgeable of gender, age, and cultural issues that may
impact the offender’s success.
5. Initiates the planning process by bringing together the neces-
sary agencies and stakeholders to evaluate the current court
processes and procedures and thereafter collaborates to coor-
dinate innovative solutions.
6. Becomes a program advocate by utilizing his or her commu-
nity leadership role to create interest in and develop support
for the program.
7. Effectively leads the team to develop all the protocols and
procedures of the program.
8. Is aware of the impact that substance abuse has on the court
system, the lives of offenders, their families, and the commu-
nity at-large. 
9. Contributes to education of peers, colleagues, and judiciary
about the efficacy of drug courts.
41. BJA DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, DRUG COURT ACTIVITY
UPDATE 2 (April 12, 2007).
42. Burke & Leben, supra note 11, at 5.
43. Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Why Do Criminals Obey the Law?
The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun





46. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule
of Law, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 283, 318
(Michael Tonry ed., 2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digiti-
zation/202743-202750NCJRS.pdf.
47. Burke & Leben, supra note 11, at 5-6.
48. Tyler, supra note 46, at 318.
49. Burke & Leben, supra note 11, at 6.
50. Tyler, supra note 46, at 287.
51. Jensen Cody Jorgensen, Public Perceptions Matter: A Procedural
Justice Study Examining an Arrestee Population 67-68 (June
2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Arizona State University),
https://cvpcs.asu.edu/sites/default/files/content/products/Jor-
gensen%20Thesis_Final2.pdf. 
52. Tyler, supra note 46, at 284.
53. Id. at 300.
“Most people care more about procedural fairness—the kind
of treatment they receive in Court—than they do about ‘dis-
tributive justice,’ i.e., winning or losing the particular
case.”42
In 2007, as the number of DTCs was expanding across the country, the AJA’s whitepaper fueled a new understanding of the impact of the principles of procedural fair-ness. 
It is a well-established phenomenon that an individual’s distrust of the police is sympto-
matic of a wider belief that the criminal-justice system itself cannot be trusted.43 This dis-
trust, according to the research, is a result of negative experiences with individual police
officers, particularly in minority and poverty-stricken neighborhoods.44 A generalized dis-
trust of the police in a particular neighborhood has been tied to increasing levels of crime
and drug use.45
As with exposure to the police, exposure to the justice system has the power to shape an
individual’s perception of the system’s overall legitimacy.46 Procedural fairness, therefore,
is a subjective evaluation of a person’s experience in the justice system and is external to
“distributive justice,” i.e., the actual outcome of the case.47 While the distributive aspect
of a case is important, individuals’ willingness to accept court decisions is rooted in their
perceptions of how they were treated during the process itself.48
The concept that the subjective perception of process fairness is more important than the
actual disposition seems contradictory to the idea of the rule of law. For most citizens,
however, the core of the justice system is about the fair treatment of an individual in a
courtroom. As the AJA’s 2007 white paper explained, “People value fair procedures because
they are perceived to produce fair outcomes.”49 This subjective evaluation of courtroom
procedures is what creates the sense of legitimacy.50 This is particularly true in criminal
cases.51 In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that in a criminal case, a defendant’s will-
ingness to obey a court’s order is linked to his or her perception of the court’s legitimacy.52
This is especially important for an individual who is being sentenced. Even if a defendant
receives a more stringent sentence than they’d hoped for, they’ll nonetheless comply with
the court’s order so long as they think the process was fair.53 This leads to better out-
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comes, as a defendant who successfully completes a probationary sentence has a reduced
likelihood of rearrest.54 It also, obviously, leads to a safer community and increases legit-
imacy of the entire justice system.
Given that this subjective evaluation is so critical to successful sentencing, what should
an individual judge do to maintain a sense of legitimacy with the individuals who appear
before him or her? The AJA white paper revealed four principles that create the condi-
tions for perceived legitimacy:55
1) Voice: The ability to participate in a case by expressing one’s viewpoint
engages individuals in the process of courtroom decision making. This
participation, as research suggests, is a critical indicator of overall satisfac-
tion with a court proceeding. It turns out that the ability to talk to the
judge increases satisfaction with the process even if individuals are told
that their input will not affect the outcome.56 The presence of voice, or
lack thereof, has been shown to affect an individual’s willingness to accept
the decision in a courtroom.57
2) Neutrality: Neutrality equates to a generalized concept of fairness. A
person who believes that a judge is fair and is balanced between both sides
is much more likely to accept the decision than one who believes that the
judge has already decided the case for reasons extrinsic to the facts or law. 
3) Respectful treatment: Although treating individuals with dignity consti-
tutes respectful treatment and creates an environment of civility, this con-
cept is incomplete. Actual fairness is not enough; the perception of fairness
must be experienced by the individual and the group of participant
observers as a whole. An individual in the courtroom must believe that he
or she has fundamental rights during the process and that those rights are
being protected. Research has shown that legitimacy is created through
respectful treatment, which, in turn, affects compliance. 
4) Trustworthy authorities: Authorities need to be seen as benevolent, car-
ing, and sincerely trying to help the litigants. Garnering that trust can be
accomplished by listening to individuals and by explaining or justifying
decisions that address the litigants’ needs. The level of trust that is gener-
ated by doing this will give participants an impression that the judge, while
not necessarily on their side, is at least open to hearing what is said and
then will decide the case fairly.58
These four principles combine to create a sense of the court’s legitimacy, and when that
perception of authority is substantiated, compliance with the law is enhanced, even when
it conflicts with one’s immediate self-interest.59 In other words, the perception of legiti-
macy, and the obedience that flows from it, are the keys to the success of the justice sys-
tem in a free society.
54. Burke & Leben, supra note 11, at 7.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspec-
tive on Voluntary Deference to Authorities, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. REV. 323, 334 (1997).
61. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 258.
62. Drug Courts Work, supra note 26. 
63. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND DECADE 3
(2006). 
64. Marlowe et al., supra note 9, at 4.
65. Id. at 25. As a caveat, Marlowe’s statement is limited to a subset of
high-risk, high-needs offenders. It should be noted, however, that
Marlowe believes those are the only offenders who should be
placed in DTCs. As Marlowe stated in his article, “According to
the criminal-justice theories of ‘Responsivity’ and the ‘Risk Prin-
ciple,’ intensive interventions such as drug court are believed to
be best suited for ‘high-risk’ offenders who have more severe
criminal propensities and drug-use histories, but may be ineffec-
tive or contraindicated for ‘low-risk’ offenders” (at 4).
66. Sally L. Satel, Observational Study of Courtroom Dynamics in
Selected Drug Courts, 1 NAT’L DRUG CT. INST. REV. 56, 59 (1998).
67. SHANNON M. CAREY ET AL., NPC RESEARCH, EXPLORING THE KEY
COMPONENTS OF DRUG COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 18 ADULT
DRUG COURTS ON PRACTICES, OUTCOMES, AND COSTS 51 (2008).
“The mechanism by which drug courts reduce substance
use and crime is through participants’ attitudes toward the
judge.”61
The intuitive understanding of the central role of the judge, which had been embracedby many of the original DTC judges in creating and operating their courts, has beensupported by significant new research. DTCs have been the subject of more scien-
tific research than any other judicial activity.62 However, the primary focus of the research
was whether DTCs were an improvement over the other types of sentencing for drug-
dependent defendants. Once it was clear that DTCs were more effective than other
approaches, the question of how they were so effective became the subject of further
research.63 Very few of those studies, however, focused on the interaction between the
participant and the judge. It is hard to imagine a DTC without the judicial status hearing
and the relationship it creates between the participant and the judge.64 Emerging research
has now substantiated that intuitive understanding, as shown by the conclusion drawn
by Douglas Marlowe, one of the preeminent researchers in the area of DTCs: “The results
of this program of research provide compelling evidence that the judge is a key compo-
nent of drug court . . . .”65
Thus, the foundation of a successful DTC is the relationship between the participant and
the judge.66 This relationship for a drug-court participant can be transformational. The
simple act of a judge rising to applaud the success of a DTC participant can be the first
step. Such small outward signs of respect in the form of rewards from the judge can moti-
vate participants in a way that improves their chances of success.67
As one of the most extensive studies on DTCs, The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evalua-
tion: The Impact of Drug Courts (MADCE), explained:
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Judges simply do not have the resources to supervise every defendant who is given an
alternative sentence to incarceration. Judges must rely upon a system of voluntary accep-
tance and compliance. Studies have shown that establishing a perceived legitimacy dou-
bles the likelihood that a defendant will obey a court order.60 The importance of judicial
legitimacy and its impact on participant compliance has emerged in a series of studies
focusing on DTCs.
68. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 117. The authors continue: 
We find no evidence that motivation for treatment, specific
deterrence, fairness of one’s court outcome, or a broad mea-
sure of procedural justice are associated with desistance in
our sample. We posit three potential explanations for this
finding. First, it is possible that the results signify exactly
what they purport, that is, that those theoretical processes
are not associated with better outcomes in drug court. Sec-
ond, it is possible that the drug courts in our sample did not
effectively implement practices that would promote those
theoretical mechanisms. Thus, for example, it is entirely
possible that although drug courts self-report adherence to
best treatment practices, treatment was not implemented in
these drug courts in a manner consistent with effective evi-
dence-based practice. Finally, it is possible that the power of
the judge (typed by legal scholars as therapeutic jurispru-
dence) is so strong that it effectively suppresses all other
theoretical mechanisms.
The authors’ definition of procedural justice is different than the
definition used in this paper. The definition of procedural fairness
used in this paper appears to comport with the three theories the
authors discuss on page 94: 
A third theory, drawn from the psychological literature,
posits that engaging drug-involved defendants in a holistic
and transparent process that maximizes perceptions of
equality, fairness, and justice (e.g., procedural justice) leads
to desistance. In a similar vein, legal scholarship has identi-
fied participants’ attitudes toward the judge—or their
beliefs about the judges’ competence, impartiality, and con-
cern for their general well-being—as being critical to sub-
sequent desistance, under the rubric of therapeutic
jurisprudence . . . . To that, we add a fifth theoretical mech-
anism, distributive justice, as measured by participants’ per-
ceptions of the justness of court outcomes.
On page 117, the authors appear to accept the body of literature
supporting the connection between procedural fairness and desis-
tance when they say: “a substantial body of literature supports
many of the underlying premises of deterrence and treatment
motivation and eagerness. Thus, it is probably fair to conclude
that if drug courts used these mechanisms more effectively, drug
court results likely would be even better.” The difference between
the definition of procedural justice in the MADCE study and the
definition of procedural fairness used in this paper allows for a
different understanding of the factual information contained in
the MADCE study.
69. Id. at 116-17.
70. Marlowe et al., supra note 9, at 25; GOLDKAMP ET AL., supra note
32, at 133.
71. BELENKO, supra note 31, at 25.
72. GOLDKAMP ET AL., supra note 32, at 107-08.
The most striking finding in this research is the power of the judge, and
judicial interactions with the offenders, to promote desistance.68
The authors continued: 
Second, there is a strong judge effect: at the between-courts level, drug
courts had an indirect effect, through attitude toward judge, on reductions
in subsequent drug use and criminal behavior. Drug courts participants
reported fewer subsequent days of drug use and crimes committed per
month, on average across all courts, 18 months later, and, they expressed
more positive attitudes toward the judge at their 6-month interview, which
in turn was associated with lower levels of drug use and crime at their 18-
month interview, on average across all courts.69
This study confirmed Dr. Marlowe’s finding that the judge plays a key role in a DTC and
other researchers’ assertion that the judge is the single most important component in a
DTC.70
While the MADCE is one of the most extensive studies of DTCs to be published, it’s not
alone in supporting the idea that the participants’ ongoing contact with a single judge is
the key component in DTCs. In a study of the Erie County, Ohio, drug court, 75% of drug-
court participants said that regular interaction with the judge helped them stay off drugs.71
In an additional study involving the Multnomah County DTC in Oregon, researchers
reported adverse ramifications when the court stopped using a single DTC judge and,
over a four-year period, instead used 22 judges and one referee.72 As a result of this deci-
sion, attendance by participants at drug-court sessions dropped sharply, and those who
appeared in front of more judges per 100 days had an increased likelihood of termination
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73. Id. at 155.
74. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 63, at 11. The report, however,
contained an interesting caveat: 
Researchers found evidence both to support and not to sup-
port the importance of the single judge approach, depend-
ing on the outcome that was examined. They speculate that
the single judge hypothesis might actually represent other
presumptions of the drug court model, such as the need for
effective judicial supervision, continuity of monitoring, and
consistency in rules and responses to participant behavior
during the drug court process. Additional studies are cur-
rently being conducted to specifically test the impact of
judicial oversight.  
75. GOLDKAMP ET AL., supra note 32, at 157.
76. Id. at 133.
77. Scott Senjo & Leslie A. Leip, Testing Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Theory: An Empirical Assessment of the Drug Court Process, 3
WESTERN CRIMINOLOGY REV. 1 (2001), http://www.western
criminology.org/documents/WCR/v03n1/senjo/senjo.html.
78. CAREY ET AL., supra note 67, at 59.
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).




85. Id. The graduation rates were 52% for programs with judges who
stayed longer versus 45% for programs with judges who stayed
less than two years.
from the program.73 Additionally, those who saw multiple judges also had an increased
likelihood of being rearrested for non-drug-related offenses.74
Participants who interacted with a single judge during their time in the DTC missed
fewer treatment sessions, were less likely to be terminated, and were more likely to com-
plete the program.75 In the focus-group sessions that followed their graduation, partici-
pants told the researchers that it was their personal relationship with the judge that was
the most important factor in their success.76
Additional research has shown that when participants were asked if they would’ve com-
pleted the DTC program without the support of their judge, 73% indicated that they did
not believe they would have.77
A study by NPC Research titled Exploring the Key Components of Drug Courts: A Compar-
ative Study of 18 Adult Drug Courts on Practices, Outcomes and Costs, reached the same
conclusion: “The interaction of the drug court judge with participants is central to the
drug court model.”78 The study investigated the length of time a single judge served in a
DTC and the impact that judicial consistency had on participants.79 Initially, the authors
confirmed results similar to those of the Multnomah County DTC study:
In programs where judges rotate more frequently, staff and participants
report that they have little continuity with the judge during the length of
the program.80
The authors then focused on the length of time that a single judge presided over a DTC.
They found that a judge who sat for at least two years had a lower recidivism rate by par-
ticipants than judges who presided for a lesser period of time.81 They also discovered that
the reduction in recidivism improved dramatically during the judge’s second year.82 A DTC
judge who served for more than two years reduced recidivism by over 300% (Figure 1).83
The reduction in recidivism also led to greater long-term cost savings, which totaled more
than 300% (Figure 2).84
The study also found that a drug-court judge who served for two years or longer had a
slightly higher graduation rate among drug participants.85
The reduction in recidivism when one judge presides for two years or longer in a DTC
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was highlighted by yet another study by NPC Research. In that study, the two judges
exhibited dramatic decreases in recidivism rates during their second year. One judge went
from an 8% reduction in recidivism in year one to a 42% reduction in year two. (Figure
3). A second judge went from a 4% reduction in recidivism to a 28% reduction.86
On the other hand, courts that use numerous judges in their DTCs do not make the best
use of the power of the judge, “as many drug courts engage in practices (such as rotating
judges or having multiple drug court judges) that would be expected to diminish judicial
effectiveness.”87
Another significant finding involved judges who presided over DTCs in the later stages of
their existence. The success rate for these later judges was better than their predecessors.88
86. Id.
87. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 117 (emphasis added).
88. MICHAEL W. FINIGAN ET AL., IMPACT OF A MATURE DRUG COURT OVER
10 YEARS OF OPERATION: RECIDIVISM AND COSTS 36 (2007),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219225.pdf.
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FIGURE 1
DRUG COURTS WITH A JUDGE WHO HAS SERVED FOR LONGER THAN TWO
YEARS HAD GREATER IMPROVEMENTS IN OUTCOME RECIDIVISM
FIGURE 2
DRUG COURTS WITH A JUDGE WHO HAS SERVED FOR LONGER THAN TWO
YEARS HAD GREATER IMPROVEMENTS IN OUTCOME COSTS (COST SAVINGS)
FIGURE 3
JUDGES IN THE FIRST AND SECOND YEARS OF DTC
89. Id. at 38.
90. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 208.
91. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 7 (emphasis added).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 106.
94. Id. at 258.
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One of the earliest DTCs, the Multnomah County Drug Court, discovered that the court
itself had to invent its own operating procedures. As the court matured, the information
was passed on from one judge to the next, leading to a more formal process where expe-
rienced judges taught their successors.89
These new judges were learning that the value of having a relationship with the partici-
pant made that individual feel respected and supported, predisposing them to success.90
According to the MADCE final report, this approach caused participants to believe
that their judge treated them more fairly than the comparison group,
including demonstrating greater respect and interest in them as individuals
and greater opportunities to express their own voice during the proceedings.
Furthermore, when offenders have more positive attitudes toward the judge,
they have better outcomes. This was true across all offender subgroups when
examining demographics, drug use history, criminality, and mental health.91
The researchers also did a separate, structured observation of the review sessions and
confirmed that DTC judges who exhibited
a more positive judicial demeanor (e.g., respectful, fair, attentive, enthusiastic,
consistent/predictable, caring, and knowledgeable) produced better outcomes
than other drug courts. Both analyses reaffirmed the central role of the judge.92
The evidence showed that individuals who felt that their judge gave them a voice by pro-
viding them with a chance to tell their story, maintained neutrality through fair treatment,
demonstrated respect, was knowledgeable about their case, and could be trusted reported
fewer days of drug use one year later, confirming the interventive power of the four prin-
ciples of procedural fairness.93
“The mechanism by which drug courts reduce substance
use and crime is through participants’ attitudes toward the
judge. When participants have more positive attitudes
toward the judge, they have better outcomes.”94
The question is no longer “does the judge’s relationship with a DTC participant affectthat participant’s success?” but “what are the best ways for a judge to build a con-nection with the participant so that successful outcomes are maximized?” It’s
increasingly clear that the answer is the adoption of the four principles of procedural fair-
ness and their active application in review sessions.  
This paper represents an original consolidation of the existing research on the four prin-
ciples of procedural fairness and their impact on DTC success.
THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN A DTC
“Drug court participants clearly personalized the experience
of appearing before and speaking to the judge in court; it
appears to have a powerful effect. Participants spoke about
being very nervous before court appearances, particularly
when they anticipated sanction or reprimand[,] and also
about the sense of satisfaction when they received positive
feedback from the judge.”95
Participants’ perception that their voice mattered in a DTC review session has beenshown to be critical to their success.96 Regular judicial interaction during a reviewsession allows participants to converse with their judge, respond to judicial queries,
and make independent statements.97 Although this level of interaction requires time,
when a judge engages in this way, it has a significant and positive impact.
NPC’s researchers established that if a judge spends the time to give participants an
opportunity to express themselves in a review session, it significantly reduces recidi-
vism.98 Further, the longer a judge interacts with a drug-court participant in a review ses-
sion, the greater the reduction in recidivism. Judicial interaction that lasts over three min-
utes reduces participant recidivism by almost half.99 A judge who spends more than seven
minutes with a participant attains more than triple the reduction in recidivism (Figure
4).100
Judicial status hearings, one of the defining features of DTCs, are admittedly both time-
consuming and expensive.101 However, a judge who meets with a participant at least every
other week during the early stages of a DTC has greater reductions in recidivism and costs
to the taxpayer than a judge who meets less often.102 When a judge meets with a partici-
95. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & AMANDA B. CISSNER, SEEING EYE TO EYE?
PARTICIPANT AND STAFF PERSPECTIVES ON DRUG COURTS, at iii (2005).
96. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 7.
97. SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., 3 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT
EVALUATION: THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE 28 (2011).
98. Shannon M. Carey et al., What Works? The Ten Key Components of




101. Marlowe et al., supra note 9, at 26.
102. CAREY ET AL., supra note 67, at 57.
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VOICE
FIGURE 4
NUMBER OF MINUTES WITH THE JUDGE AND THE RESULTING
REDUCTION IN RECIDIVISM
103. Id.; see also Anna M. Malsch & Paige M. Harrison, NPC Research,
Reentry Court Planning, Implementation, and Evaluation, pre-




105. Senjo & Leip, supra note 77.
106. Id.
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pant every two weeks, there’s a nearly 50% reduction in recidivism (Figure 5)103 and an
over 50% cost savings to the taxpayer (Figure 6).104
These statistics are supported by responses from the participants themselves. In one
study, 65% of respondents said that they would not have been able to complete the drug-
court program if they had appeared before a judge less frequently.105
Participants have been telling researchers since the inception of DTCs that their relation-
ship with the judge was a major factor in their success in becoming drug-free.  One study
found that 77% of DTC participants thought it was important or somewhat important
that they talk to the judge during a review session (Figure 7).106
FIGURE 6
JUDGES WHO MET WITH PARTICIPANTS EVERY OTHER WEEK
DURING PHASE 1 HAD A GREATER SAVINGS FOR THE TAXPAYERS
FIGURE 7
PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPANTS WHO FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO
TALK TO THE JUDGE DURING A REVIEW SESSION
FIGURE 5
JUDGES WHO MET WITH PARTICIPANTS EVERY OTHER WEEK
DURING PHASE 1 HAD LOWER RECIDIVISM
Giving voice to a DTC participant led to a more positive attitude toward the judge, which,
in turn, caused greater reductions in drug use and crime.107 Participants in the study also
felt that their judge gave them greater opportunities to express their own voice during the
proceedings.108 There is a marked correlation between participant success and voice (Fig-
ure 8).109
107. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 259.
108. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 7.
109. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 95-96.
110. Id. at 98.
111. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 259.
112. NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, supra note 9, at 13.
113. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 29.
114. Id. at 224.
115. Id.
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NEUTRALITY
FIGURE 8
THE IMPACT OF VOICE IN DTCs
“Hence, taking steps to promote a fair court experience, and
having a judge who can serve as an effective symbol of the
court’s commitment to fairness, neutrality, and respect, can
improve concrete offender outcomes . . . .”110
The impact of having a voice in the proceedings is dramatically reduced if the partic-ipant holds a perception that a magistrate has pre-decided the outcome. The statussession in a DTC creates an opportunity for judges to use their inherent authority in
a productive way. The repeated sessions enable judges to engage the participant in ways
that are fruitful and establish ongoing relationships that are perceived as fair.111
Praise by a judge is a primary reward that can be offered to participants in a DTC.112
Judges in DTCs are almost eight times more likely to praise the defendant than judges in
non-DTCs (Figure 9).113
Using praise as a reward for appropriate behavior has been shown to significantly reduce
recidivism and drug use.114 In one study, the number of crimes expected to be committed
after 6 months was reduced by 19.3% and at 18 months was reduced by 9.8% when com-
pared to a court that does not offer rewards (Figure 10).115
There was also a decline in the number of expected days of drug use, with a reduction of
9.2% at 6 months and 6.3% at 18 months (Figure 11).116
The impact of rewards is enhanced when the judge is the sole provider of those rewards,
both in terms of recidivism (Figure 12) and savings to the taxpayers (Figure 13).117
An additional benefit of the judge being the sole provider of rewards is a slight increase
in program graduation rates.118 Interestingly, in their study, NPC researchers found no
116. Id.
117. CAREY ET AL., supra note 67, at 51. Special thanks to Dr. Carey for
translating the cost-savings data to recidivism data.
118. Id.
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FIGURE 9
POSITIVE JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONS RECEIVED BY DRUG-COURT
AND COMPARISON OFFENDERS
FIGURE 11
NUMBER OF EXPECTED DAYS OF DRUG USE WHEN
REWARDS ARE GIVEN
FIGURE 12
REDUCTION IN RECIDIVISM WHEN JUDGE IS SOLE PROVIDER OF REWARDS
FIGURE 10
NUMBER OF CRIMES EXPECTED WHEN REWARDS ARE GIVEN
evidence that suggested a judge should be the sole provider of sanctions for program
violations. This suggests that sanctions, equitably applied, have little impact upon par-
ticipant perceptions of judicial fairness or neutrality. However, there is an unmistakable
connection between participant success and judicial neutrality (Figure 14).119
119. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 96.
120. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 211.
121. Id. at 209.
122. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 7.
123. Id.
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FIGURE 13
COST SAVINGS WHEN JUDGE IS SOLE PROVIDER OF REWARDS
FIGURE 14
THE IMPACT OF NEUTRALITY IN DTCs
RESPECTFUL TREATMENT
“Programs with judges that treated clients fairly and respec-
tively were shown to achieve better success than programs
without such judges.”120
The commonality shared by top-performing DTCs is that the judges who preside over them understandthe importance of making participants feel respected, which leads to better outcomes.121 Participants inthese top-performing courts believed that their judge treated them with more respect than participants
in a comparison group.122 This perception was validated by research observations that found that DTC judges
who were respectful presided over courts that were more successful.123
A study of a domestic-violence court modeled on the components of the DTC found that
the respect that existed between the participant and the judge appeared to be the primary
reason that the defendants complied with the court’s orders.124
DTCs with judges who treat participants respectfully achieve better success than pro-
grams without such judges.125 In contrast, judges who use criticism and negative feedback
had higher rates of recidivism.126
In addition to promoting neutrality, judicial praise is a particularly important way of
showing respect to participants. Drug-court participants who received judicial praise
more often and who had a higher frequency of judicial status hearings reported commit-
ting fewer crimes and using drugs on fewer days.127
Moreover, participants do less well with judges who do not deviate from a fixed sanction
structure.128 Judges who are flexible in following a known sanction structure are almost
two and a half times more likely to reduce recidivism when compared to judges who fol-
low a rigid sanction structure (Figure 15).129
Even judges who rarely follow a known sentencing structure are more than twice as likely
to prevent recidivism as judges who follow a rigid structure.130
Judges who follow a flexible pattern and customize incentives and sanctions are almost
one and a half times more likely to reduce drug use than those judges who follow a rigid
pattern and twice as likely to reduce drug use as judges who rarely follow a sentencing
pattern (Figure 16).131
124. Carrie J. Petrucci, Respect as a Component in the Judge-Defendant
Interaction in a Specialized Domestic Violence Court that Utilizes
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 263, 295 (2002).
125. Scott R. Senjo & Leslie A. Leip, Testing and Developing Theory in
Drug Court: A Four Part Logit Model to Predict Program Comple-
tion, 12 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 66, 66 (2001). Note: Some have
suggested that the results of the study may suffer from a causa-
tion problem, as those who do well in the program are more
likely to receive praise and encouragement.
126. Terance D. Miethe et al., Reintegrative Shaming and Recidivism
Risks in Drug Court: Explanations for Some Unexpected Findings,
46 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 522 (2000).
127. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 259.
128. Id. at 211.
129. Id. at 144.
130. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 144.
131. Id. at 144-51.
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FIGURE 15
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CRIMES PREVENTED PER MONTH
Research findings confirm that judges who show defendants respect through the use of
positive reinforcement and a willingness to be flexible in their sanctions preside over the
most successful DTCs.132 In these high-performing courtrooms, participants understand
that their judge is treating them as individuals, taking into account both their efforts and
their circumstances.133 Courts that are considered too rigid or too flexible are less suc-
cessful and may, in fact, create frustration and noncompliance through their inconsis-
tency or rigidity.134 This suggests that providing participants with a known set of sanc-
tions that are applied with flexibility, are not arbitrary, and are clearly explained creates a
sense of respect in participants that enhances DTC success.135
There’s a distinct association between participant success and respectful treatment (Fig-
ure 17).136 DTC participants who perceived their judges as respectful committed 8.5%
fewer probation violations, committed 8.1% fewer new crimes, and had a 12.2% reduc-
tion in days of drug use.
132. Id. at 211.
133. Id. at 208.
134. Id. at 211.
135. Janine M. Zweig et al., Drug Court Policies and Practices: How Pro-
gram Implementation Affects Offender Substance Use and Criminal
Behavior Outcomes, 8 DRUG CT. REV. 43, 74-75 (2012).
136. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 95-96.
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FIGURE 16
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS COURTS PREVENTED SUBSTANCE USE
FIGURE 17
THE IMPACT OF RESPECTFUL TREATMENT IN DTCs
“Most clients indicated that the judge was fair, respectful,
and trustworthy. Moreover, the judge was believed by the
majority to be influential in terms of their progress.”137
DTC participants who believed that their judge could be trusted to be fair andtreated them with respect reported fewer days of drug use 18 months into the pro-gram.138 Additionally, participant trust in the judge is critical to participant success
in a DTC, according to a report published by the National Institute of Justice:
Offenders report that interactions with the judge are one of the most
important influences on the experience they have while in the program.
They respond to the judge’s interpersonal skills and ability to resolve legal
problems expeditiously and provide ready access to services.139 Thus, it’s
not just the amount of time a judge spends with a participant during a
review session, but how the judge interacts with the person. A judge must
be knowledgeable about the participant. The best way for a judge to
become acquainted with each participant is to attend the staffing session.140
The staffing session, also known as a DTC team meeting, generally occurs
just before the courtroom review session.141 During these sessions, the
team generally reviews how each participant has done since his or her last
court date and recommends to the drug court (judge) what action to take
or what topics to address with each participant.142
The information gained during a staffing session allows the judge to become familiar with
each participant, knowing their name and the circumstances of their case, thus providing
the foundation for a sense of trust.143 Studies show that a judge who attends staffing ses-
sions reduces recidivism by more than 300% (Figure 18).144
However, attending the staffing session is only the beginning. Judges who are not willing
to do the additional work necessary to gain a participant’s trust are unlikely to preside
137. Christine A. Saum et al., Drug Court Participants’ Satisfaction with
Treatment and the Court Experience, 4 DRUG CT. REV. 39, 56
(2002).
138. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 106.
139. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 63, at iii.
140. Shannon M. Carey, 2013 Best Practices Top 10, presentation to
Michigan Association of Drug Court Professionals, slide 62
(2013) (on file with the author).
141. Carey et al., supra note 98, at 37; Michael Tobin, Participation of
Defense Attorneys in Drug Courts, 8 DRUG CT. REV. 96, 106. The
staffing is generally composed of the judge, attorneys, coordina-
tor, probation, treatment, and a representative from law enforce-
ment. 
142. Tobin, supra note 141, at 106.
143. THE DRUG COURT JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 39, at 47-61. 
144. Carey, supra note 140, at slide 62.
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FIGURE 18
REDUCTION IN RECIDIVISM WHEN JUDGE ATTENDS STAFFING MEETINGS
TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITIES
over successful DTCs.145 Courts with judges who understand the value of building trust
with participants by making them feel respected and supported create a positive relation-
ship. This positive attitude toward the judge has a direct impact on a participant’s subse-
quent success:
[R]espondents who displayed a more positive attitude toward the judge six
months after the baseline interview (e.g., said their judge was knowledge-
able about their case, gave them a chance to tell their side of the story,
could be trusted to treat them fairly, treated them with respect) reported
fewer days of drug use in the subsequent 18-month interview.146
This participant feedback is supported by actual observation. Judges with high positive
attributes (i.e., judges who were respectful, fair, attentive, enthusiastic, consistent, pre-
dictable, caring, and knowledgeable) were able to establish trust, which led to reduced par-
ticipant drug use when compared to judges who were not considered to be trustworthy.147
Judges who were highly trusted were almost twice as effective in preventing drug use as
judges who were not highly trusted (Figure 19).148 DTCs whose judges were perceived as
trustworthy also prevented crimes among their participants.149 The positive attributes that
each DTC judge displayed created an environment of trust. When participants came to the
understanding that they could trust their judge, their chances of success increased.
145. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 260.
146. Id. at 106.
147. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 197; see also AMANDA B. CISSNER
& MICHAEL REMPEL, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE STATE OF
DRUG COURT RESEARCH: MOVING BEYOND “DO THEY WORK?” 11
(2006) (“By contrast, the overriding prevalence of negative and
stigmatizing judicial feedback was held largely responsible for
the negative evaluation results (higher rates of re-offending
among participants than the comparison group) in one study of
the Las Vegas drug court.”). 
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 98.
151. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 7.
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“[T]aking steps to promote a fair court experience, and hav-
ing a judge who can serve as an effective symbol of the
court’s commitment to fairness, neutrality, and respect, can
improve concrete offender outcomes . . . .”150
The factors that make up a successful DTC are diverse, but the emerging researchdemonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the interaction between a judge anda participant is central to that success.151 The bond between participant and judge is
not solely dependent upon the judge’s personality but rather upon the nature of that
judge-participant relationship.  
FIGURE 19
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS OF DRUG USE PREVENTED PER MONTH
SUMMARY
Different judges have different outcomes. There are significant divergences in DTC partici-
pant re-arrest rates based upon the judge.152 As the authors of the MADCE study conclude:
[T]hese findings suggest that although drug courts are effective at pro-
moting desistance in their present form, there is potential for drug courts
to be even more effective.153
Making DTCs more effective requires focusing on the role that the judge plays:
First, even though we find that the judge has a prime role in shaping par-
ticipant behavior, we note that drug courts do not necessarily maximize
the potential of the judge—as many drug courts engage in practices (such
as rotating judges or having multiple drug court judges) that would be
expected to diminish judicial effectiveness. And finally, although other the-
oretical mechanisms were not shown here to be effective at modifying
behavior, a substantial body of literature supports many of the underlying
premises of deterrence and treatment motivation and eagerness. Thus, it is
probably fair to conclude that if drug courts used these mechanisms more
effectively, drug court results likely would be even better.154
The mechanisms for improvement are the application of the four principles of procedural
fairness. There’s a strong correlation between the principles and reductions in drug use,
crimes committed, and probation violations (Figure 20).155
The evidence is overwhelming. For a DTC to be successful, a judge must provide partic-
ipants with an opportunity to voice their concerns and a sense that they’re treated with
respect by a neutral and trustworthy authority.156 The combined effect of the four princi-
ples of procedural fairness leads DTC participants to respond in a way that creates greater
success. The success that these participants find in the courtroom transmutes into soci-
etal success, which reduces crime and decreases costs borne by taxpayers. This is the
community-wide impact of procedural fairness.
152. FINIGAN ET AL., supra note 88, at 36.
153. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 117.
154. Id.
155. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 97.
156. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 212.
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FIGURE 20
THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS ON DTCs
FOR DTC JUDGES
1. Read the AJA’s 2007 white paper, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satis-
faction.157 It will provide a deeper understanding of the key components of procedural
fairness and act as a primer for the day-to-day operation of a DTC.
2. Promote Voice
• Practice being a better listener. As the 2007 AJA white paper noted: “Listening is not
the absence of talking. There are some excellent books about improving listening.
The first step is good self-analysis. Each of us has different strengths and weak-
nesses. All of the literature concludes that you can become a better listener. The
local academic community might be a good repository of advice.”158
• Hold frequent judicial status hearings, which will provide participants more oppor-
tunities for voice. Frequent status hearings increase participant contact with judges,
which research has shown to be critically important. Additionally, in light of previ-
ous research on this topic, consider increasing the frequency of status hearings for
“high risk” participants in particular.
• During judicial status hearings, begin by greeting each participant by name, and
conclude by offering well-wishes. Give participants a chance to speak before mak-
ing key decisions. When making decisions, show respect by acknowledging partic-
ipants’ points of view. Even when their voiced opinion does not change the out-
come, participants are more likely to view the decision as fair when they’ve been
heard.
• Spend at least three minutes with each participant. As previously discussed, the
more time above three minutes spent with the participant, the greater the reduction
in recidivism.
3. Promote Neutrality
• Take time, when admitting a participant into a DTC, to explain the rules that will
apply to the program and what rights they are giving up when they enter. This will
also begin the process of establishing trust. The better participants understand the
process, the more likely they are to succeed. 
• At the start of a judicial status hearing, explain the ground rules. Explain what is
going to happen and why cases are going to be called in a particular order. Remind
participants of their responsibilities and consequences of compliance and noncom-
pliance in multiple hearings; ask if participants need new copies of the handbook or
other materials used to deliver incentives and sanctions. It will help the new partic-
ipants understand the nature of a status hearing and serve as a reminder for those
who have more time in the program. 
• When making a decision, cite relevant laws, procedures, or program policies.
• Always provide due process before imposing sanctions. 
4. Promote Respect
• List incentives and sanctions and their ground rules in the participant handbook but
maintain some flexibility when applying them. Have examples of incentives and
sanctions and the grounds for them in the handbook.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
157. Available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/pdfs/AJAWhitePaper9-26-
07.pdf.
158. Burke & Leben, supra note 11, at 20.
• Be flexible in the imposition of incentives and sanctions by giving the participants’
circumstances due consideration. Explain the reasons to both the participant and
observers in the courtroom. 
5. Promote Trust
• Be positive. Judges who were more supportive of participants produced better out-
comes.  Establish trust by being respectful, fair, consistent, caring, and knowledge-
able about participants’ lives. Do this by focusing on the participant instead of the
computer or other things on the bench. Make use of nonverbal cues like eye contact
and facial expressions. Avoid negative language and sarcasm. Do not sigh or express
exasperation.
• Attend all staffing sessions before the status hearing. Attendance at the staffing ses-
sion will provide judges with information about individual participants that will
improve judicial interaction with those participants. This, in turn, will give partici-
pants a sense that the judge can be trusted.
• Ensure that participants comprehend the nature of the judicial status hearing and
their place in it. It’s the judge’s responsibility to ensure that the participants, and the
people in the courtroom supporting them, understand the process. 
FOR COURTS
6. Judges may take some time developing effective approaches in a DTC, and, therefore,
a reasonable period of time may be needed before their style effects change in offender
behaviors. For this reason, routinely rotating judges on and off drug-court benches will
likely decrease judges’ ability to successfully implement their roles and reduce the
overall level of success of those drug-court programs.
7. Prepare judges new to the assignment by having them watch the online program for
DTC judges, observe a DTC staffing and session, and read The Drug Court Judicial
Benchbook.159 Have the judge attend an orientation and judicial training as soon as pos-
sible after being assigned to the DTC.160
8. Choose DTC judges carefully. Not all judges are suited to the DTC model. Assigning a
judge who does not believe in engaging participants or who will not follow the four
principles of procedural fairness will negatively affect the operation of the DTC. The
court will be best served if the judges assigned to the DTC docket are those who are
committed to such courts and, equally as important, to the precepts of procedural fair-
ness.
9. Monitor the DTC judge. There are a number of ways this can be accomplished. For
example: distribute a survey at graduation asking participants about their attitude
toward the judge or request that observers from the Supreme Court administrative
office or the state drug-court association observe both staffing sessions and status hear-
ings. Call in an outside expert to observe and provide technical assistance, including
judicial coaching, to increase effectiveness. Use the data collected through these meth-
ods to help educate the judge in the core values of procedural fairness. 
10. Provide a written handbook about the DTC to participants. The handbook should be
in plain language and should include DTC policies, procedures, and expectations,
including the incentives and sanctions. 
159. Available at http://www.ndci.org/Transitioning_Judges.
160. To register for courses at the National Judicial College, visit
https://register.judges.org/default.aspx?p=S12-WBTDCI.
Court Review - Volume 52 31
11. Courts should send DTC judges to procedural-fairness trainings conducted by quali-
fied judicial educators. Administrative offices of the courts should provide continu-
ing education in this area.
FOR RESEARCHERS
12. Additional research examining the impact of the other members of the DTC team, and
clients’ perceptions of them, should be performed. This would allow the DTC com-
munity to determine the level to which these team members can further influence
reductions in drug use and crime. Specifically, researchers could investigate attitudes
toward primary case managers, probation officers, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.
13. Continuing studies on the impact of judges trained in the four principles of proce-
dural fairness and DTC success should be undertaken. 
FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATORS
14. In our 2007 white paper, the AJA called upon the National Science Foundation and
others who fund social-justice research to reach out to judges to develop strategies
that ensure that sound, academic social-science research is shared in forms that are
likely to produce change within the courts. Journals like Court Review, the quarterly
journal of the American Judges Association, and judicial-education conferences are
key venues for the dissemination of this information. We renew this call with an
added emphasis on the need to share research on the effects of procedural fairness in
DTCs. 
15. The AJA encourages judicial educators to distribute this paper. If judicial educators
make appropriate and accessible information about procedural fairness easily avail-
able to DTC judges, change will begin to occur, even without a call for specific action.
16. Train judges on best practices regarding the four principles of procedural fairness.
Judges do not innately have the traits that elicit the most positive outcomes from par-
ticipants. As a result, drug-court training programs should be developed to specifi-
cally address best practices.
17. DTC judges should be formally educated on the implications of research regarding
procedural issues and the action steps available to them. Procedural fairness might be
developed as an intensive course of study presented by the NADCP or its educational
branch, the National Drug Court Institute. In addition to considering procedural fair-
ness as a stand-alone subject, the AJA suggests that training on procedural fairness be
integrated into the NADCP’s annual educational conference.
18. Judicial educators should train judicial trainers in procedural fairness. The AJA will
do its part by developing a program to train the trainer on the core principles of pro-
cedural fairness. 
19. The American Judges Association calls on the National Judicial College to develop a
course on procedural fairness and to integrate its principles in its general-jurisdiction
courses.
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FOR JUDICIAL LEADERS
20. The AJA encourages the Conference of Chief Justices to place the issue of procedural
fairness in DTCs on its agenda. Each state chief justice has enormous influence on the
agenda for justice and education in his or her state. Collectively the Conference of
Chief Justices can set the agenda for our nation’s state courts. Many states already are
deeply committed to the development of additional DTCs, and many individual chief
justices are champions of this issue. The AJA would be happy to work with the Con-
ference of Chief Justices DTC committee in developing ways to teach state DTC
judges the four principles of procedural fairness. 
21. The AJA also encourages the Federal Judges Association to place the issue of proce-
dural fairness in DTCs on its agenda. The AJA would be happy to work with the Fed-
eral Judges Association and the Federal Judicial Center to develop ways to teach fed-
eral DTC judges the four principles of procedural fairness.
22. The AJA encourages the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Veterans Administration,
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to fund research specifically
targeted to improving the procedural fairness of DTCs, veterans’ treatment courts,
and DWI courts. The AJA encourages the National Center for State Courts and the
Center for Court Innovation to join it in developing educational approaches to inte-
grating procedural-fairness principles into DTCs. 
23. The AJA encourages the American Bar Association and other bar-association leaders
to join with the courts to ensure greater procedural fairness in our DTCs. Lawyers
need to be educated on the social-science research described in this paper so that all
of the stakeholders within the court system can work together toward a system of jus-
tice that can be respected by all.
Judge Brian MacKenzie is an award-winning judicial educator who has
written and presented on a broad range of issues, including procedural fair-
ness, veterans’ treatment courts, domestic violence, and court-media rela-
tions. He was honored by the Foundation for the Improvement of Justice
with the Paul H. Chapman medal for significant contributions to the Amer-
ican criminal-justice system. He is the co-editor of the book Michigan Crim-
inal Procedure, and his most recent article is Extrajudicial Speech: Judicial
Ethics in the New Media Age, published by the Reynolds Courts & Media Law Journal. 
Judge MacKenzie is currently the Chief Financial Officer of the Justice Speakers Institute,
having retired from the 52nd District Court, located in Novi, Michigan, after almost 27
years of service. He has served as President of the American Judges Association and Pres-
ident of the Michigan Association of Drug Court Professionals and was the American Bar
Association/National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Judicial Fellow. 
Judge MacKenzie received his Juris Doctorate from Wayne State University Law School
in 1974. He is married to Karen MacKenzie, and they share three children (Kate, David,
and Breanna) and three grandsons (Daniel, Raymond, and Henry).
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Family drug courts (FDCs) were first established in 1994 asone judge’s response to substance abuse in the majority ofhis dependency-court cases.1 Since then, hundreds of sim-
ilar specialized dependency courts have been established
around the country. FDCs are based on an adult-drug-court
model established in response to the apparent revolving door
of drug offenders in criminal court. Drug courts and other
problem-solving courts seek to identify the social and psycho-
logical dysfunction that brought the individuals before the
court. Problem-solving-court judges adopt therapeutic
jurisprudence to assess the dysfunction, prescribe appropriate
services, and provide support, encouragement, and account-
ability. Procedural justice, characterized by judicial leadership
and participant autonomy, is one of the psychological tools
used to successfully adopt therapeutic jurisprudence. Success-
ful problem-solving courts rely on judicial leadership for the
network of providers and to engage with the participants.
Additionally, the voluntary nature of problem-solving courts
ensures participants are given autonomy and allowed to exer-
cise voice and control in the process. 
In this article, we explore the successes and struggles of one
family drug court, the Family Treatment Drug Court (FTDC)
Track, in Lancaster County, Nebraska. The FTDC Track devel-
oped out of a voluntary FTDC initiated by a Lancaster County
juvenile-court judge with grant funding. Funding from Project
Safe Start–Nebraska was used to train court personnel (includ-
ing a Department of Health and Human Services case manager
dedicated to the FTDC), provide Child Parent Psychotherapy
to families, and ensure parents on the Track were able to get
immediate treatment placement through an agreement made
with a local residential treatment facility. At the termination of
the grant, the Lancaster County FTDC no longer had any
incentive to offer participants, and the court had difficulty
enrolling parents. Judge Roger Heideman, the first author and
a Lancaster County juvenile-court judge, decided to create a
mandatory Family Treatment Drug Court Track. Any families
with allegations of child abuse or neglect related to substance
use or abuse by a parent are assigned to Judge Heideman’s
docket, ordered to participate in the FTDC Track in the dispo-
sitional order, and receive specialized services, more frequent
meetings, and more supervision and accountability.2
An independent evaluation, including case-file reviews and
parent interviews, demonstrates that the mandatory nature of
the FTDC Track has not negatively impacted perceptions of
fairness. Forty-two cases have been assigned to the FTDC
Track since it began in early 2014. Parents report that they feel
the process of getting their children returned to them is fair
and that they can be open and honest in team meetings. Addi-
tionally, parents on the FTDC Track report that they receive
praise from the judge more than do families not on the Track.
Though the FTDC Track is mandatory, parents on the FTDC
Track indicate that they feel they have a voice in the depen-
dency-court process. 
This article will first discuss the goals and tools of problem-
solving courts, specifically the role of the judge in implement-
ing therapeutic jurisprudence through the use of procedural-
justice principles. Next, it will discuss the development of fam-
ily drug courts and how the FTDC Track was started and
developed in Lancaster County. The goals and methods of the
FTDC Track will be presented, along with the results of an
ongoing evaluation of the FTDC Track. Finally, the article will
conclude with an in-depth discussion of the evolution of the
FTDC Track, emphasizing the issues faced, solutions imple-
mented, and lessons learned. Though problem-solving courts
are usually voluntary, the experience in the FTDC Track
demonstrates that there are alternative ways to give partici-
pants voice in a mandatory program. 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
Problem-solving courts seek to identify and address the psy-
chological and social issues that bring individuals before the
court, including drug addiction, mental illness, and domestic
violence. Juvenile court, first established in Illinois in 1899,3 is
often considered the first problem-solving court.4 Each day,
dependency-court judges consider issues of permanency case
by case, based on the issues facing each family. Judges consider
whether parents are suffering from mental illness, substance
abuse, or other relevant issues and determine what will best
address those needs, including treatment, vocational training,
parenting classes, and other rehabilitative services. More
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recently, judges in adult court have also looked beyond the tra-
ditional legal goals of the criminal-justice system to address
the revolving door of nonviolent offenses.5 Drug courts,6 men-
tal-health courts,7 and domestic-violence courts8 seeking to
address this concern have been established across the country.
Specialized dependency courts have also begun to focus on the
specific issues facing families, establishing family drug courts
and family domestic-violence courts. 
Like traditional dependency courts, problem-solving courts
and specialized dependency courts should be based on the
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence to address the psycho-
logical and social causes of crime.9 Therapeutic jurisprudence
is a change in jurisprudential practice that incorporates social
science into the legal system and recognizes the (often nega-
tive) impact the law and legal actors can have on an individ-
ual.10 The judge acts as a therapeutic agent by assessing the
social and psychological malfunctions of the defendant, pre-
scribing services to address those malfunctions, and providing
social support through listening and accountability to promote
compliance.11 Therapeutic jurisprudence provides judges
insight into what they need to know and do to be successful
through psychological principles. 
Procedural justice is among the tools and principles avail-
able for successful application of therapeutic jurisprudence.12
As discussed in this article, “procedural justice” refers to the
evaluation of formal decision-making procedures as fair and
unbiased.13 The fair-process effect demonstrates that when
individuals are allowed to present their side of the story, they
are more satisfied with the outcome and the experience.14 Fair
process has been operationalized in the research as providing
participants the opportunity to express their preferences.15
Through a variety of mechanisms, evaluations of fair process
and satisfaction with the process predict compliance with the
outcome, such as the court order.16 As a tool of therapeutic
jurisprudence, judges in prob-
lem-solving courts employ the
principles of procedural justice
by actively listening to partici-
pants’ needs and concerns.17
Judicial leadership is key to
successfully implementing prob-
lem-solving courts with thera-
peutic jurisprudence and proce-
dural justice.18 Participants
receive signals related to proce-
dural justice from the judge. The
judge’s therapeutic actions,
including active listening, over-
sight, and engagement, commu-
nicate to participants that their preferences and needs are
heard, valued, and respected, and that someone else cares
about the outcome of their case.19 When judges take the time
to listen to the court participants’ successes and struggles, as
problem-solving-court judges do, participants experience and
evaluate the whole process differently, as more just and fair.
The just-and-fair evaluation increases the likelihood the par-
ticipants will engage in services, comply with court orders, and
be successfully discharged from the court. 
Traditionally, respect for participant autonomy and expres-
sion of preferences are considered central to ensuring thera-
peutic jurisprudence and procedural justice. Problem-solving-
court judges should seek to avoid paternalism and allow par-
ticipants to decide for themselves if they want treatment and
the other benefits that go along with participation or if they
would rather address the charges in a traditional court.20 The
voluntary nature of problem-solving courts is thought to pro-
vide for self-determination and choice, which are central to
psychological health.21 Additionally, it allows participants to
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express their preferences or
exercise voice and gives partici-
pants some process control, two
of the central features of proce-
dural justice. It is important for
the psychosocial well-being of
the participants and their per-
ceptions of and engagement in
the process that participants do
not feel coerced into treatment.
Problem-solving courts are
thought to achieve the goals of
therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural justice in part
through their voluntary nature. 
Problem-solving courts generally aim to address a particular
population or problem in the court system. One population
that is particularly vulnerable is abused and neglected chil-
dren. Problem-solving courts can help improve outcomes for
vulnerable children involved in dependency cases. Family
drug courts developed to address cases where children are
removed from their parents’ care due to substance-abuse
issues. 
FAMILY DRUG COURTS
Judge Charles McGee implemented the first family drug
court in 1994 as a response to observing that a large majority
of cases on his dependency-court docket involved substance
abuse.22 In the more than 20 years since then, over 300 juris-
dictions have established such programs.23 FDCs were adapted
from the adult-criminal-drug-court model with an emphasis
on individualized services and substance-abuse treatment.24
The general FDC model stresses the importance of coordinat-
ing substance-abuse treatment with child protective services.
Parents are presented with the option to voluntarily enroll in
the FDC instead of participating in the traditional dependency-
court docket. FDCs often involve more frequent hearings or
meetings, escalating sanctions for infractions, and rewards for
compliance and case progression.
An important aspect of FDCs is the relationship between
the judge and the parents. In an FDC in Pima County, Arizona,
the judge served a case-management function and was focused
on providing parents with support in substance-abuse treat-
ment. This may explain the findings that parents in the Pima
County FDC perceived more trust and fairness in the judge
than non-FDC parents perceived in their social worker.25
These findings provide evidence that a judge highly involved
in all aspects of the case can result in better perceptions of fair-
ness by the parents. 
For these reasons, Judge Linda Porter in Lancaster County,









from Project Safe Start–Nebraska and the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). The Pro-
ject Safe Start grant, starting in 2010, intended to raise the bar
for services for young children and their relationship with
their parents, particularly in families with methamphetamine
abuse. These grants enabled Judge Porter to establish a volun-
tary family-treatment drug court that followed the core tenets
of family drug courts. The initial FTDC paid for Child Parent
Psychotherapy, an evidence-based therapy that helps reestab-
lish healthy parent-child relationships and was not paid for by
Medicaid in Nebraska until more recently. In 2014, Judge Hei-
deman assumed the role of the presiding judge of the FTDC.
The families were provided with a specialized substance-abuse
intake and a caseworker dedicated to the FTDC. In addition,
families participated in monthly team meetings with the judge
and more frequent review hearings than non-FTDC depen-
dency cases. 
The Lancaster County FTDC was entirely voluntary; par-
ents who have substance abuse alleged in the petition were
given the option of proceeding with the Lancaster County
FTDC or with the traditional court system. Initially, the main
incentive for participating in the Lancaster County FTDC was
the immediate availability of treatment and payment for Child
Parent Psychotherapy. A treatment provider in Lincoln,
Nebraska, agreed to hold beds open for parents involved with
the program. This meant that parents would be able to enter
treatment immediately instead of having to be placed on a
waiting list that could mean days or weeks before getting treat-
ment. Once the grants that funded the initial Lancaster County
FTDC ended, there was less incentive to participate in the
additional hearings and team meetings. Very few parents chose
to participate with the Lancaster County FTDC.26
Families were not asked why they refused to participate.
However, one hypothesis suggested by the team in Lancaster
County is that there was not enough of an incentive to partic-
ipate. In adult criminal drug court, the incentives are clear and
very different from those defendants can receive in adult crim-
inal court (e.g., expungement of record). But the incentives in
Lancaster County FTDC did not differ from those in tradi-
tional dependency court. Parents who comply with court
orders and complete a case plan in both FTDC and traditional
dependency court will work toward reunification with their
children and case closure. There were no immediately obvious
benefits to participating in the Lancaster County FTDC, other
than potentially pleasing the judge. 
In early 2014, Judge Heideman decided to change the Fam-
ily Treatment Drug Court from a voluntary program to a
mandatory one. The program would retain many of the other
tenets of the FTDC, except parents would not be presented
with the choice to participate. This raised several concerns
minutes. He sits at the table with
the parents and does not wear
his judicial robes. The judge
engages the parents, asking them
for updates and how they feel
the case is going. Importantly, he
directly asks the parents for a
self-assessment of their progress.
This allows parents to express
their hopes and frustrations and
allows all parties to get a sense of how the parents are feeling
about their own progress. The judge directly gives the parents
praise or criticism based on their report. Throughout the case,
the judge ensures that the parents are aware that everyone’s
goal is to have the children safely reunified with their parents. 
In addition, any party is able to schedule an emergency
team meeting to address concerning behaviors or new situa-
tions such as a discharge from treatment or loss of housing.
This provides the ability to immediately get the parent back on
track. Parties can address issues as they arise instead of waiting
for future hearings. This prevents parents from deteriorating
quickly. 
90-Day Review Hearings
In addition to the monthly team meetings, the families have
formal review hearings every 90 days (or more frequently if
necessary). More frequent review hearings have been held for
issues such as a change in treatment needs or reported non-
compliance with the case plan. These hearings are more struc-
tured than the team meetings. Judge Heideman presides from
the bench, attorneys can call witnesses and raise objections,
and parties introduce exhibits into evidence. The judge issues
orders following the review hearings. 
Specialized Substance-Abuse Services
Case managers dedicated to the FTDC Track have familiar-
ity with what services are available for people with a history of
substance abuse. All recommendations the case managers sub-
mit to the court incorporate best practices for families with
parental substance abuse. Parents undergo recommended drug
and alcohol treatment that may range from outpatient to long-
term inpatient. All parents are also required to undergo ran-
dom drug and alcohol testing. The preferred method of testing
is a call-in method where the parent must call in to the desig-
nated line each morning to know if they are scheduled to test
that day. The judge prefers this method, as it allows the parents
to be accountable for their own testing. 
If the family includes children under the age of five, the
family also receives a Parent Child Interaction Assessment
(sometimes referred to as a Safe Start Assessment) and Child
Parent Psychotherapy if needed. The assessment and the ther-
apy are designed to address any trauma or harm caused by the
parental substance abuse and accompanying events that led to
the removal of the child. This evidence-based therapy can help
repair and enhance the parent-child relationship, promote the
child’s social and emotional development, and minimize the
harmful developmental consequences that may have resulted
from the necessity of being placed in care.  
Other services that address the specific needs of this popu-
about the program. For one, it was possible parents would be
resistant to a mandatory track that included elements addi-
tional to the traditional dependency court. Also, the team was
concerned that making the FTDC mandatory would funda-
mentally change the effectiveness of the program. The team
decided to conduct an evaluation of the new program to deter-
mine if these concerns were warranted. 
FAMILY TREATMENT DRUG COURT TRACK
The new program was renamed the Family Treatment Drug
Court Track to reflect its mandatory nature. The FTDC Track
was officially implemented in January 2014. The main goals of
the FTDC Track include: establish a network of evidence-
based service providers who have experience with substance
abuse and can adequately serve families; provide ongoing sup-
port to parents; monitor families’ growth and progress and
acknowledge positive steps with praise; allow parents to assess
their own strengths, weaknesses, and progress throughout the
Track; and provide services for children to ensure healthy emo-
tional and physical development through evidence-based prac-
tices. The main components of the FTDC Track are identifica-
tion and selection of families, monthly team meetings, emer-
gency team meetings as needed, 90-day review hearings, spe-
cialized trauma-informed substance-abuse and parenting ser-
vices, and timely implementation of corrective measures. 
Identification and Selection of Families
As stated above, the FTDC Track is mandatory for eligible
families. The primary way families are identified as eligible for
the FTDC Track is if parental substance abuse is identified in
the affidavit supporting the removal of the children from the
parents’ care. This could include individuals who were on
drugs or in possession of drugs while caring for their child or
whose child tested positive for drugs at birth. These families
are automatically placed on Judge Heideman’s docket. Families
are also identified as eligible if parental substance abuse is
identified in the initial investigation by Child Protective Ser-
vices or if parental substance abuse is identified following
adjudication. All eligible families are placed on or transferred
to Judge Heideman’s docket. The only exception is if the fam-
ily has had a prior child-dependency-court case with a differ-
ent juvenile-court judge; these families remain with their ini-
tial judge unless that judge determines the FTDC Track is a
better option for the family. It is not known how many families
qualify for the FTDC Track but remain with another judge. 
Monthly Team Meetings and Emergency Team Meetings
Each family participates in a monthly team meeting that
includes the caseworker, parents, parents’ attorneys, guardian
ad litem, county attorney, and any other interested party. The
judge is not present for the first part of the team meeting. The
caseworker leads the team meetings but involves and engages
the parents as much as possible. For example, the caseworker
asks the parents to report on their own progress in the case,
state their self-reported sobriety date, and inform other parties
how the children are doing. If there is an issue the parties come
to agreement on, such as visitation, the parties can stipulate to
changes in the rehabilitative plan. 
Judge Heideman joins each team meeting for the last 10




them . . . how
they feel the
case is going.
27. In 2014, the median number of months from removal to reunifi-
cation in the southeastern Department of Health and Human Ser-
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lation include an assigned Par-
ent Partner (a peer mentor who
has had prior experience with
dependency court) and parent-
ing classes such as Circle of
Security (a relationship-based
parenting class designed to
enhance attachment security
between children and parents).
The services are tailored to each
family and designed to put the
parents back on track to be
reunited with the children. 
Potential Corrective Measures 
If a parent fails to participate
in ordered services or otherwise
is not complying with the provisions of the case plan, the case-
worker may use corrective measures. These measures are only
ordered following disposition. Corrective measures include (1)
paying lab costs associated with drug tests, (2) participating in
structured activities, and (3) completing writing assignments.
These corrective measures are designed to hold the parent
accountable for his or her actions and to provide a structured
schedule to give the parent less time to be tempted by drugs or
alcohol. 
Parents will never be terminated from the FTDC Track. The
only ways parents are discharged from the Track are (1) reunit-
ing with their children and closing the case or (2) terminating
their parental rights to the children. As long as the family has
an open case, the family will be on the FTDC Track. 
EVALUATION OF THE FTDC TRACK
As stated above, an evaluation of the FTDC Track is ongo-
ing to ensure the mandatory nature of the Track does not
impede its effectiveness or deter parents from fully engaging.
Members of the evaluation team reviewed case files for infor-
mation on dates of court hearings, case-closure information,
and case plans. In addition, members of the evaluation team
interviewed parents following family team meetings on their
perceptions of the FTDC Track. 
Case Information 
As of October 15, 2015, 42 families have participated in the
FTDC Track for a total of 69 children (average age = 2.2 years).
Twenty-eight families (66.7%) identify as white, four (9.5%)
identify as African-American, four (9.5%) identify as Hispanic,
and three (7.1%) identify as American Indian (the race and
ethnicity of the remaining families are unknown). 
Eleven cases (26.2%) have closed as of October 15, 2015,
due to establishment of permanency via reunification (N = 6)
or termination of parental rights and successful adoption (N =
5). The average number of days between when the petition is
filed to the date the court terminates its jurisdiction over the
case is 451.1, approximately 15 months. The parents in nine
cases additional to the above closed cases (21.4%) have relin-
quished their parental rights, and the parents in three addi-
tional cases (7.1%) have had their parental rights terminated. 
Notably, it is becoming clear early in FTDC Track cases
whether children can be safely reunited with their parents or
whether alternative permanency options need to be pursued.
Children have been reunified with a parent in 11 cases
(26.2%). Anecdotally, it appears that children are reunifying
with parents relatively quickly (on average, 213.8 days, or
about 7 months).27 Parental rights have been relinquished or
terminated in 12 cases. The average number of days from the
petition being filed to parents relinquishing their parental
rights is 428 days, a little over 14 months. The average num-
ber of days from the petition being filed to the filing of a
motion to terminate parental rights is 389.1 days, or less than
13 months. Although these data are preliminary, they indicate
that the parties are able to identify whether reunification or an
alternative permanency placement should be sought early in
the case. 
Parents’ Perceptions of Procedural Justice 
A member of the evaluation team conducted interviews
with parents following team meetings. The interviewer
explained that he or she was assisting the judge in implement-
ing and evaluating the Track and that the judge would appre-
ciate hearing from parents involved with the Track. The inter-
viewer also told the parents that their individual responses
would never be shared with the judge or any other person out-
side the evaluation team; the responses would only be aggre-
gated and shared in summary form. 
Parents who agreed to answer the questions were given a
form with 11 questions about their experiences on the Track.
The questions asked the parents whether they thought the
process was fair and how much say they had in the process.
The parents also answered questions about their relationship
with Judge Heideman and their case manager. Each question
was answered on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). Statements were aimed at parents’ perceptions of the
fairness of the court process and the degree to which they felt
comfortable speaking at team meetings. Parents were allowed
to skip questions if they did not feel comfortable answering
and also had the opportunity to provide comments and ques-
tions about the Track at the bottom of the form. 
To examine whether a difference exists between parents
involved with the FTDC Track and those who were not, eval-
uators interviewed eight parents from five families involved in
dependency cases in Judge Heideman’s court who were not on
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28. Parents interviewed for the control group do not have substance
abuse identified as an issue contributing to their involvement in
the court. Therefore, it is not a perfect comparison group but the
best one that could be constructed because it was not feasible to
do a randomized control trial. 
29. Parents are interviewed at multiple time points throughout the
case to evaluate changes in perception over time, but due to the
small sample size, the results presented here are only for one
interview from each parent. We included the parent’s most recent
interview in these analyses. 
30. Ashford, supra note 1.
the Track.28 These families are different than FTDC Track fami-
lies because they did not have allegations of substance abuse
included in the petition or subsequently discovered in the ini-
tial investigation, but the parents did have children removed
from their care. These comparison families only participated in
traditional dependency court, and the judge did not attend their
team meetings (held every three months). 
Forty-three parents were interviewed in 33 separate FTDC
Track cases.29 Overall, parents seemed to appreciate the Track
and recognized that it aims to safely return the children to the
parents’ care. Twenty-nine parents (65.9%) agreed that the
process of getting their children back was fair, and 38 (88.4%)
agreed that the goal of the FTDC Track was to get their children
returned to them. Thirty-four (79.1%) reported that they had
access to the services they needed to get their children returned
to them. Importantly, the majority of parents (86%) stated that
they knew what needed to be done to get their children
returned to them. These results indicate that parents under-
stood the FTDC Track process and viewed it as fair. 
A majority of parents on the FTDC Track reported that they
had voice in the process of getting their children returned to
their care. Thirty-three parents (76.8%) agreed that their voice
was heard at family team meetings; thirty-one (72.1%) agreed
that they had a say in decisions that affected them and their
children. This is important because it demonstrates that parents
still felt like valuable participants in the process even though
the FTDC Track is mandatory. 
As discussed above, judicial leadership and parents’ relation-
ship with the judge are both important in problem-solving
courts. Thirty-six parents (83.7%) reported that they received
praise from the judge when they made progress toward their
goals. In contrast, only 30 parents (69.8%) stated they received
praise from their caseworker when they made progress. Consis-
tent with previous research,30 it appears that parents on the
FTDC Track have a positive relationship with the judge. 
The parents in the comparison group not on the FTDC Track
perceived the dependency-court process similarly to those on
the Track. The majority (87.5%) recognized that the goal of the
process was to get their children returned to them, reported that
they knew what needed to be done to have their children
returned to their care (87.5%), and said that they had access to
the services they needed (87.5%). Additionally, all of the par-
ents indicated that they felt comfortable speaking in team meet-
ings, but just over half (62.5%) felt that their voice was heard in
team meetings. The majority (87.5%) agreed that they had a say
in the decisions that affected them and their children. Five par-
ents (62.5%) agreed that the dependency-court process was fair.
Overall, there were not many differences in how parents on the
Track and traditional dependency-court parents perceived the
process. 
Similarly, the majority of non-Track parents (75%) agreed
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that they received praise from
their caseworker when they
made progress toward their
goals. Five (62.5%) agreed that
they could go to their case-
worker if they had concerns
about their ability to meet their
goals. However, only three non-
Track parents (37.5%) agreed
that they received praise from
the judge when they made
progress toward their goals as
compared to the majority (83.7%) of Track parents. Track par-
ents reported receiving praise significantly more than did non-
Track families (x2(4) = 19.806, p = .001). 
Parents on the FTDC Track may perceive more praise from
the judge than similar parents not on the Track. Though the
comparison group is small, preliminary analysis shows that
proportionally more parents on the Track report receiving
praise from the judge than parents not on the Track. This indi-
cates that the FTDC Track may be fostering a more positive
relationship between parents and the judge, a factor that may
be important in improving outcomes for children. 
DISCUSSION
Judicial leadership plays a major role in problem-solving
courts and can lead to better engagement among participants.
Participants who are engaged in the process and perceive the
process as fair are more likely to comply with the terms of the
process. This can result in better outcomes for all participants,
including vulnerable children in family problem-solving
courts. 
One potential barrier to implementing problem-solving
courts and maintaining the implementation is funding. Fund-
ing is often temporary or contingent on factors external to the
program itself, thus not always guaranteed for any length of
time. Once a problem-solving court loses its funding, it may be
difficult or impossible for the court to continue. 
For family drug courts in particular, the loss of funding may
mean the program can no longer support the incentives that
encourage parents to participate in a voluntary program. FDCs
require parents to participate in more meetings and to be sub-
jected to more potential sanctions than traditional dependency
court; there is no real incentive from FDCs themselves. Pro-
grams often include incentives for parents, such as the imme-
diate availability of a treatment bed. But without a funding
source, these incentives become more difficult to maintain. 
One solution to that problem is to make the FDC manda-
tory for eligible parents. However, an important part of many
problem-solving courts is that they give participants a voice in
the process, beginning with the decision to choose to partici-
A majority of
parents . . .
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pate. If a program is no longer voluntary, participants could
perceive the program as less fair and feel that they have less of
a voice in the process. 
This article describes one program that was mandatory for
all eligible participants. From the beginning, the program was
driven by strong judicial leadership that encouraged all pro-
gram participants, from caseworkers to attorneys to parents,
that the program would help children safely reunify with their
parents. A year and a half after implementation of the program,
the mandatory FTDC Track is working well. Forty-two fami-
lies have participated in the Track; eleven of these families
have successfully reunified. Families appear to be either reuni-
fying or terminating the relationship between parents and chil-
dren more quickly than in other dependency cases. Children
seem to be achieving permanency quickly in FTDC Track
cases. In addition, the mandatory nature of the Track does not
appear to hurt perceptions of procedural justice. Parents report
they feel they have a voice in the process and that their voice
is heard at team meetings to the same extent as in traditional
dependency court. The similarity of these ratings is not sur-
prising because traditional dependency court and the FTDC
Track are both problem-solving models, seeking to address
social and psychological dysfunction. Importantly, parents on
the FTDC Track recognize that the judge praises them for their
progress toward their goals. This indicates the relationship
between parents and the judge is positive, despite the manda-
tory nature of the Track. 
More data collected over time can help determine whether
the Track successfully and safely reunifies children with their
parents when there are issues with substance abuse. Such a
program can be a model for other courts that wish to use a
problem-solving court to address substance abuse in depen-
dency cases but lack long-term funding to implement incen-
tives to participate. Preliminary results indicate that judicial
adoption of therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural-justice
principles can have a positive impact for substance-abuse-
involved parents and their children in dependency court, even
if participation in the program is not voluntary. 
LESSONS LEARNED FOR OTHER COURTS
For other courts considering beginning a mandatory FDC,
there are a few important lessons the Lancaster County FTDC
Track has taught the authors. First, judicial leadership is vital
to the success of the Track. A judge will have to devote con-
siderable resources to the Track and convince other court per-
sonnel of the Track’s importance. Part of judicial leadership is
being a therapeutic agent to the parents on the Track. This
includes providing support to parents in a way that may be
very different than traditional dependency court. Informal
interaction can help parents relate to the judge and see him or
her as another support person instead of someone who is
working to keep their kids away from them. Second, the
mandatory nature of the Track does not necessarily take away
from its impact. This may be because the informal interaction
with the judge creates a relaxed, collaborative atmosphere and
allows for the parents to feel they are an important part of a
team. Lastly, it is very important to create buy-in to the Track
early on in the process of development. Many individuals,
including court personnel, Department of Health and Human
Services staff, family support agencies, and mental-health ser-
vice providers, can give important insight to what is needed to
help parents succeed. Whatever form a family drug court may
take, it will help parents in their journey and will work toward
the goal of reunifying children with their families. 
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On any given day, in courtrooms across the country,judges witness the unfortunate consequences of drugabuse reflected by some offenders who are in court
“nodding out” from a “heroin high” while waiting for their
cases to be called. A steady stream of people with untreated
mental-health issues also enter courtrooms, often displaying
oppositional attitudes, disruptive behavior, and cognitive dis-
abilities. Judges are understandably frustrated with the justice
system’s revolving door in which these offenders continuously
rotate and with a system that cannot adequately address the
numerous complex issues, insufficient life skills, and collateral
problems that contribute to drug abuse or help users navigate
to recovery. These individuals and problems are not the sole
domain of the criminal-justice system and, unfortunately, are
represented equally in civil and other non-criminal matters—
just in another context. 
The lessons we have learned and skills we have developed
serving as drug-court judges are powerful, and they provide
cogent strategies for dealing with traditional court litigants in
the variety of criminal and civil matters that “full service” trial
judges handle. This article describes drug-court-employed
options and strategies used effectively over the last two
decades to address drug use and associated mental-health con-
ditions—approaches that promote healing and rehabilitation
with substantially better results than those achieved by tradi-
tional punitive methods. This article also offers a roadmap for
applying successful drug-court techniques, available to all
judges in traditional court settings—techniques that will
widen a judge’s repertoire of judicial skills. 
THE CONTRAST BETWEEN COURTS 
Drug courts encourage behavioral changes in offenders by
imposing a regime of immediate behavioral management,
known as sanctions and incentives; intense community super-
vision; frequent drug testing; appropriately matched treatment;
and a range of support services under the vigilant monitoring
of the judge. As Judge Brian MacKenzie’s white paper in this
issue1 so compellingly demonstrates, although each drug court
is different, the dynamic and continuous interaction of the
judge with each defendant is a critical factor. Someone once
said, “They may forget what you said, but they will never for-
get how you made them feel.”2 The quality, length, frequency,
and content of communications with a judge are meaningful
and purposeful. A judge becomes familiar with the partici-
pant’s personal life and triggers to aid in recovery. In contrast,
the role of the judge in most traditional courtrooms is that of
an impartial arbiter who has limited interaction with the
defendant, even at the sentencing phase. 
Let’s start by considering how a case would traditionally
proceed in court. John, a 20-year heroin abuser, ingests “as
much as I can get every day.” As a result of his abuse, he has
numerous arrests and convictions and has failed several treat-
ment attempts. Continuous drug usage has altered his brain
chemistry, which overwhelms his self-control and compels
continuous drug-seeking behaviors. A probation order issued
by the sentencing judge—who emphasized his order by wag-
ging his finger and demanding John to immediately stop using
drugs—will not trump John’s compulsion to use. John will tell
the judge whatever he believes will gain his release and propel
him to his next “fix” on the streets. Once John is back in the
community, the sentencing judge will play no role in John’s
post-sentence probation. Rather, John’s probation officer or
community-service supervisor, juggling an exhaustive case-
load of other offenders, will try to provide adequate supervi-
sion. John’s drug-testing regime will likely be inconsistent and
sporadic. His treatment program may also be insufficient to
meet his needs. 
Only when John fails to comply with the court’s orders will
he find himself before the judge for a probation-revocation or
adjustment hearing—a negatively driven process, often in cus-
tody and where the tension is often palpable. The judge super-
vising John’s case, as with most traditional court judges who
are exposed to a steady diet of probation violators, is frustrated
by the persistent failure of those under her supervision and by
the repeat violations of her sentencing orders. Business as
usual is particularly unsatisfying. 
If John were in drug court, however, both he and the judge
would find a very different view of probation, the justice sys-
tem, and his potential future. The atmosphere during drug-
court hearings is dramatically different; it is often didactic,
motivating, and healing. While in court, the judge is engaging
and instructive, and the defense and prosecuting attorneys are
collaborative, not adversarial. The approach is therapeutic;
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built on praise, not punishment; and built on treatment, not
threats.
As illustrated by Judge MacKenzie’s white paper, the effi-
ciency of the typical drug-court techniques is supported by
extensive research, which reveals significant improvement in
the lives of participants, often dramatic reduction in recidi-
vism, and substantial cost savings to the criminal-justice sys-
tem and society.3 Not surprisingly, drug-court judges who have
witnessed the extraordinary transformation of their most diffi-
cult participants routinely employ drug-court techniques
when sitting in traditional judicial assignments. 
THE ROADMAP
BEGIN YOUR JOURNEY TOGETHER: DEVELOP A 
RELATIONSHIP
The hallmark of drug court is the unique relationship
between the judge and the defendant. Although their styles
may differ, drug-court judges uniformly step beyond the tradi-
tionally distant and formal judicial persona and adopt a variety
of roles to motivate positive behaviors and admonish negative
ones. It is not unusual for drug-court participants to credit
their improvement and success in the program to the judge’s
encouragement and enthusiasm: “for caring about me when I
did not care about myself.” This noteworthy rapport that
defendants establish with the judge is, for many offenders, the
first time a person of stature has taken the time to engage with
them, demonstrate concern, and offer constructive assistance. 
Case volume in traditional courts is frequently offered as
the reason preventing the judge from spending more than a
perfunctory amount of time with each defendant. Yet research
has shown a significant reduction in recidivism when the judge
spends “adequate” time with each participant to demonstrate
interest in their lives, build trust, and create a bond. The criti-
cal question that remains is whether judges are ready to invest
the necessary time, maybe only minutes, to influence offend-
ers’ lives and encourage them to finally exit through the
revolving door. 
Signpost: Build a Relationship
Courts can be intimidating and overwhelming, which can
interfere with a person's capacity to understand what is hap-
pening in the court. Employing the principles of procedural
fairness—ensuring people are treated fairly in court—helps
create a more positive atmosphere and improves perceptions of
the court. Social-science research overwhelmingly supports the
notion of affording parties sufficient opportunity to express
themselves—having a voice in the matter before a neutral
arbiter—and is a key component
of procedural fairness. Getting
the rule or law “right” is pro-
foundly important for judges,
but, although counterintuitive,
litigants confirm that case out-
comes are not as important to
them as the perceived procedural
fairness of the litigation.4
People naturally want to win
their case, but they are also will-
ing to accept loss or punishment
if they feel that the court proce-
dures were fair, they had the
opportunity to present their side
of the case, and their case was considered by the court.5 Parties
need to trust the process and feel that they have received
respect from the judge. Spending a bit of time to learn about
the defendant initiates a rapport, reduces barriers to listening,
and creates an environment for improvement. Additionally,
acceptance and compliance with orders is significantly
increased when the reasoning for decisions is explained and
expectations and requirements are adequately described.
MAPPING THE ROUTE: OBTAIN BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION
The crushing volume of cases in many courts can intensify
the challenge of assuring adequate time to provide individual-
ized justice at all stages of court proceedings. The focus of
many courts sadly becomes disposing of the docket, not lis-
tening to the cases. Time limitations can also easily be used to
rationalize a court’s failure to obtain necessary information for
fashioning meaningful sentences or probation plans. As in the
trial stage, where the court requires evidence to make informed
decisions, the sentencing phase also demands that the court
obtains relevant information regarding a defendant’s back-
ground to craft an appropriate and meaningful sentence that
will have a chance of success—one that will shape the defen-
dant’s future as well as protect the public.
Even the most conscientious and mindful judges may render
decisions at times that are less than precise. Faulty decision
making can be affected by a variety of factors, including
depleted physical resources, multitasking, mood, and fluency
(i.e., ease of processing information).6 Judges also fall victim to
“decision fatigue” as reflected in a study that demonstrated that
sentencing decisions varied depending on the sequence in
which criminal cases were presented during the day.7 However,
a judicial officer’s decisions can have substantial direct and con-











sequential impact on the lives
and freedom of those before
them. We expect our doctors to
offer their most thoughtful and
well-researched recommenda-
tions regarding our treatment
after reviewing our history,
administering necessary tests,
and making a thorough case
evaluation; so too should indi-
viduals under our supervision—
and tangentially, the public—
expect nothing less from us.
Judicial imperfection is inherent in judicial decision making
and impossible to eliminate, but it can be reduced with infor-
mation produced from appropriate risk-and-needs assessments.
Signpost: Assess First, Sentence Last 
Drug courts consistently require initial risk-and-needs
assessments before program entry, as well as ongoing evalua-
tions throughout the program to monitor progress and to
ensure that proper treatment and services are provided. An
assessment provides a comprehensive criminogenic examina-
tion of psychosocial problems; measures criminal risk factors;
and measures other issues contributing to an individual’s sub-
stance-abuse issues that, if addressed, will reduce the likeli-
hood of recidivism or failure on community supervision.
Too often defendants are plagued with co-occurring issues
or cognitive brain injuries, which can hinder their ability to
navigate even life’s daily obligations, much less court orders.
Therefore, it is critical for a judge to be informed of the nature
and extent of these problems to fashion a meaningful sentence
that ensures the appropriate treatment is ordered and that
proper probationary conditions are imposed—a sentence that
will positively shape the defendant’s future as well as protect
the public. Good assessments before sentencing can mean the
difference between success and failure. For example, one par-
ticular drug-court risk-and-needs assessment revealed that an
offender, before the court for prostitution and drug usage, had
been sexually abused by her father. Armed with that informa-
tion, the court ensured that the probationer received trauma
treatment.
Not every case requires special attention from the judge, but
for those offenders who would benefit from more concentrated
efforts, assessments can significantly enhance a judge’s ability to
make informed decisions, especially where drug and mental-
health issues are extant. Good information and sound assess-
ments are possible and, indeed, just as important in traditional
courts. “Garbage in, garbage out” is sadly applicable without
assessments, and obtaining sufficient information at the front
end will decrease future probation-violation hearings and jail
consequences and will avoid setting defendants up for most cer-
tain failure. Time constraints are a challenge, but, with sound
case management, they are a challenge that can be overcome. 
Signpost: Assess—The Sooner the Better
Drug-court research indicates that offenders should be
enrolled in drug-treatment services “promptly”—that is, as
quickly as possible—after a crisis or a triggering event when
motivation to engage in treatment is strongest and before
resolve diminishes.8 For many chemically dependent individu-
als, an arrest for drugs or related crimes is a crisis, an attention-
capturing event that may motivate, at least momentarily, an
offender’s desire for help. Many traditional criminal courts lack
the ability or willingness to address treatment issues until the
merits of the case are resolved and the offender is definitively
placed under a posttrial supervision order of the judge. How-
ever, failing to intervene with treatment during this critical
early window of opportunity delays the offender’s recovery and
promotes the likelihood that the drug behavior will continue,
affecting the offender, family, and community. 
The court system is perfectly positioned to intervene in the
lives of drug offenders and to facilitate treatment even before
trial, leaving the lawyers to haggle over legal outcomes. For
years, the Baltimore City judiciary recognized that the failure
of the justice system to install identification and placement
mechanisms immediately after arrest led to lost opportunities
to engage drug offenders in early treatment while negative
behaviors continued awaiting trial. After prodigious and con-
certed efforts and negotiations with health-department offi-
cials, however, certified assessors were assigned to each court-
house, and judges now routinely obtain same-day assessments
and treatment placements before defendants leave the courts at
any stage in the proceedings. Baltimore City’s success is not
unique but is regrettably far from standard. Early assessments
and engagement in treatment is a best practice, and our citi-
zens deserve nothing less.
TURN ON GUIDANCE SYSTEM: ENHANCE PROBATION
Many probation offices, inundated by large caseloads, often
focus their limited resources on violent, higher-risk, younger
defendants and place drug-addicted criminals on minimal
supervision. Judges lament the ineffectiveness of probation
and are frustrated by their inability to adequately help individ-
uals under their supervision. By default, many defendants do
not receive intensive support services and the stricter commu-
nity supervision they need; regrettably, many of these individ-
uals violate probation and are returned to the sentencing judge
to address their failures. By that time, the persistent dysfunc-
tional and damaging behavior has continued, if not com-
pounded, their problems. The probationers have frequently
committed new offenses, families and communities have been
disrupted, and the negative cycle of despair and destruction
has continued.
A judge’s relationship with the defendant does not have to
end after imposition of the original sentence. Drug courts pro-
vide the model for maintaining continuous contact with each
participant through ongoing judicial interaction. At periodic
status hearings or progress conferences, the court conducts
meaningful exchanges with each participant to learn about the
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before trial . . . .
participant’s challenges and successes. Defendants are encour-
aged to express themselves to the judge, who monitors defen-
dants’ behavior and develops significant relationships with
them that are critical to defendants’ improvement and achieve-
ment of goals.
Signpost: Personalizing Probation 
Certain defendants clearly warrant closer monitoring of
their probationary conditions and will benefit from additional
personalized support and attention from the court. Instituting
periodic status reviews fills the gap between what traditional
probation supervision can realistically provide and what
offenders may actually need. Status reviews telegraph care and
concern to neglected defendants who have received little atten-
tion or nurturing in their lives. 
Additionally, the court is able to hold service providers
accountable for their supervision and delivery of services and
to encourage greater vigilance of the offender. As a result,
judges have a front row seat to watch the positive changes and
advances of their probationers—typically seen in drug-court
settings but rarely in traditional courts. Hearings can also be
structured to showcase these probationers before an audience,
whose members are waiting their turn before the court, which
also adds a therapeutic and didactic quality to the hearing.
Demands on judicial schedules warrant that only the most
appropriate candidates are chosen to ensure that dockets are
manageable and will be based on criteria determined by the
individual judge (e.g., younger defendants, mental-health
issues, poor motivation, depression, lack of family or commu-
nity support). Additionally, the judge can regulate the fre-
quency of these reviews to accommodate crowded court calen-
dars and defendant needs (e.g., every two weeks, bimonthly,
quarterly).
The positive impact that one caring judge can have upon
defendants under his or her supervision is remarkable and is
well worth the effort to justify the added work.
SHARE THE DRIVING 
EXPERIENCE: CREATE A
PARTNERSHIP
There is often an inherent
distrust of the police among
the criminal population, which
too frequently generalizes to
the entire criminal-justice sys-
tem. Previous justice-system
experience also teaches offend-
ers that it is unsafe to admit
failures, confess drug relapses,
or ask for help—especially to probation officers. However,
these are exactly the disclosures that should be reinforced and
rewarded to aid recovery. Drug-court judges embrace this
behavior-management technique and regularly encourage—if
not order—participants to inform their community supervi-
sors, treatment providers, and drug-court team members of
obstacles and of when they fear relapse, are in crises, or are in
need of assistance. At drug-court hearings, participants will
hear the persistent mantra “we cannot help what we do not
know.” The goal is to encourage defendants to seek help and to
take responsibility for their recovery and success.
Signpost: Develop Trust
Traditional courts can create similar opportunities through
“partnerships” or verbal or written contracts with defendants
that encourage them to contact their attorney or probation
agent or to return to court and seek assistance. To achieve suc-
cess, defendants must broaden their support network, which
includes the court, and pursue help before disaster strikes. The
court must create a place of safety that encourages offenders to
seek help when they are struggling with their treatment or
when barriers thwart their recovery. Judges must ensure that
probation officers will not threaten arrest of probationers who
admit to drug use—otherwise, the probationers will refuse to
share their mistakes. This does not convey a license to use
drugs; rather, it establishes an environment where honesty is
rewarded and help-seeking behavior is promoted. Research sug-
gests that, on average, highly addicted offenders submit to mul-
tiple treatment episodes before reaching sustained recovery.
One probationer did exactly as instructed and reminded the
judge of “our partnership” when he appeared in court request-
ing help obtaining additional job services. The judge’s staff, in
turn, connected the probationer to the appropriate agency. 
These “partnerships” are indeed possible in traditional
courts, and defendants can be encouraged to take advantage of
the judge’s offer to intercede.
ENJOY THE SCENERY AND AVOID THE HAZARDS:
SHAPE BEHAVIOR
The concept of sanctions and incentives is not part of the
typical curriculum for new judges—or perhaps even envi-
sioned as necessary during one’s judicial career—but when
employed correctly, it can greatly improve the judge’s success
with offenders. Behavioral management is based upon numer-
ous scientific studies that support the use of contingency-man-
agement strategies of rewards to encourage positive behavior






his or her 
supervision is
remarkable . . . .
PERSONALIZED PROBATION:
A SUCCESS STORY
Joe, a 19-year-old African-American defendant who
appeared before a court for drug distribution had a sordid
history of delinquency. In foster care since age 2, he was sus-
pended from school numerous times and was expelled for
fighting by the 10th grade. His inauspicious career in the
juvenile system began as a car thief at age 13. By age 14, he
smoked marijuana daily and soon graduated to pills and
heroin. In addition to standard probation, the judged placed
him on “personal probation,” which required his periodic
return to court for status conferences to monitor achieve-
ment of his probationary conditions that included obtaining
a GED, a job, and life-skills training. His public defender, in
an unusual gesture, also agreed to be his mentor and sched-
uled routine visits. Through periodic reviews, the court con-
veyed to Joe that his life mattered and that he would not be
abandoned again. Joe thrived and successfully completed
probation.
9. Douglas B. Marlowe, Applying Incentives and Sanctions, in THE
DRUG COURT JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK 139 (Douglas B. Marlowe &
William G. Meyer eds., 2011).
10. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2d ed. 2006).
11. James G. Murphy, Rudy E. Vuchinich & Cathy A. Simpson,
Delayed Reward and Cost Discounting, 51 PSYCHOL. REC. 571
(2001).
12. Douglas B. Marlowe & Kimberly C. Kirby, Effective Use of Sanc-
tions in Drug Courts: Lessons from Behavioral Research, 2 NAT’L
DRUG CT. INST. REV. 11 (1999).
and sanctions when necessary
to reform behavior.
Behavioral research indicates
that changes most consistently
occur when individuals are
rewarded for positive behavior.
Drug courts consistently recog-
nize and structure rewards for
defendant progress by using a
variety of tangible motivational
devices, such as award of trin-
kets, gift cards or certificates,
and bus passes. Intangible
responses, such as applause, praise, marking accomplishments
in open court, and decreasing program requirements, are
equally effective and powerful. Drug-court graduation cere-
monies are standard events to celebrate achievement. 
Noncompliant behaviors are handled through an array of
graduated sanctions, which range from verbal reprimands;
essays (write 25 things you will do the next time you are
tempted to use drugs); courtroom or jury-box detentions;
community service; and short periods of jail confinement.
Signpost: Using Incentives and Sanctions 
Not every judge has either the temperament or desire to sit
in drug court, and there is a range of motivational behaviors
that even some drug-court judges will not engage. However,
there are many alternatives to standard drug-court incentives
and sanctions that can enhance the effectiveness of an
offender’s experience and improve case outcomes and that are
remarkably effective in traditional court settings. 
Research has garnered the following seminal principles that
guide drug courts and can be adapted in other court settings:
Specificity. Clearly and unambiguously defining the behav-
iors that are expected will reduce confusion. Concrete words
should be employed, such as “appear at all treatment appoint-
ments” and “complete community service within two
months.” In contrast, “do not engage inappropriate behavior”
is not specific and is open to interpretation.9
Fairness. Participants are more likely to comply with court
orders when they believe they are being treated fairly and with
respect and that they are capable of completing the required
behavior. Procedural fairness dictates that they should also be
afforded an opportunity to explain their situation and under-
stand the basis for the court’s decision.10
Certainty. The judge should consistently monitor accom-
plishment of probationary conditions and specific goals and
consistently respond by reward or punishment as appropriate.
Immediacy. Speed is essential. Incentives and sanctions
should be imposed as soon after the behavior as possible to
have the greatest influence on transforming behavior. Admon-
ishing a negative behavior days after its commission dilutes its
effect or even renders the response fruitless.11 Consider the
ineffectiveness of admonishing a child for negative behavior
weeks after the event.
Magnitude. The strength or severity of the incentive or
sanction should be commensurate with what is realistically
achievable by the defendant at the time of its imposition. One
would not expect a novice jogger to win a 25K race without
sufficient training. In the same vein, it would be unrealistic to
demand abstinence before a chronic drug user has significantly
engaged in treatment and developed skills to comply. Imposing
severe sanctions too early can lead to frustration and a feeling
of helplessness and may cause participants to abandon their
efforts.12
Setting incremental and achievable benchmarks to note
accomplishments is an excellent technique for encouraging
behavioral change. Success can also be highlighted in open
court. Linking completion of goals and positive behavior with
incentives or rewards is another hallmark and standard in all
drug courts. By example, a defendant on “personal probation”
was praised by the court during a status hearing for present-
ing documentation that she had attended daily self-help meet-
ings and acquired a sponsor. The judge subsequently reduced
her probationary period upon proof that she completed treat-
ment.
DON’T DRIVE UNDER THE INFLUENCE: DRUG TESTING
A robust drug-testing program is the most immediate,
objective, and effective method of monitoring drug use and
ensuring defendant accountability. However, to be effective,
drug testing must be randomly administered, any day of the
week. Reinforcing this point, a drug user once quipped, “When
you schedule tests, I schedule usage.” A vigorous drug-testing
protocol is considered so vital that drug-court testing, accord-
ing to the Best Practice Standards of the National Association
of Drug Court Professionals, remains constant throughout the
life of the program—certainly at least until the last phase of the
program—even as most other requirements are decreased in
response to advancement through the program (e.g., reporting
to community supervision appointments or court hearings).
Signpost: Require Vigilant Drug Testing
The accuracy of self-disclosure, although encouraged, is
inconsistent among the criminal-justice population and, as in
drug court, the traditional court judge should maintain over-
sight by ordering defendants to submit to drug testing
throughout probation. Ideally, testing should be random and
no less than twice weekly for addicted individuals. A struc-
tured testing regime offers the court needed information to
hold defendants accountable for their behavior and demon-
strates the effectiveness of probation and the court’s vigilance.










LEARN FROM EXPERIENCED DRIVERS: COURTROOM
CONNECTION
Drug-court hearings afford the judge continuous opportuni-
ties to instruct, motivate, encourage, or admonish, when neces-
sary, participants in an effort to therapeutically promote posi-
tive behavioral changes. Hearings are didactic and educational
for the individual standing immediately before the court, as
well as for the audience members who await their turn. Drug-
court judges also receive training regarding the physiological,
cognitive, and behavioral effects of drugs on the system, as well
as behavioral-modification and interviewing techniques to
facilitate and improve their interactions with participants. The
drug-courtroom setting provides a dynamic and continuous
forum for participants to learn from both their individual inter-
actions with the judge and from their fellow colleagues.
Signpost: Reach and Teach
Every court occasion, no matter the nature of the docket,
provides opportunities for the court to connect with litigants
and to help them learn. As the court commends an offender for
attending parenting classes and reuniting with her child, the
audience listens. As the court offers to find supportive housing
and treatment for an addicted youthful offender who was aban-
doned to the streets at an early age, the offender feels less
alone, thanking the judge for caring—and the audience listens.
As the court discusses with warring parents alternatives to
abusive language and physical fighting in front of their chil-
dren, the audience listens. As the court reframes conflicts to
empower individuals who feel victimized, the audience listens.
Learning how to encourage without preaching, to artfully
guide others toward constructive behavior, does not require a
psychology degree. But judges who obtain training regarding
the physiological effects of drugs on the brain, the dynamics of
mental-health issues, or motivational interviewing are better
equipped to make a difference they hope to see in those under
their charge.
Courtrooms can be arenas for tension, stress, and highly
charged emotions. Litigants are often afraid and intimidated by
their opponents, the lawyers, the judge, and the court process.
Additionally, an increasing number of individuals appearing in
court suffer from mental-health challenges and co-occurring
disorders. Some litigants yell at opponents and display opposi-
tional or even contemptuous conduct, which may be attribut-
able to these behaviors. Again, a bit of training will aid the
judge in considering the genesis of disruptive behavior and
addressing these situations calmly and with aplomb and
finesse.
MAKE STOPS ALONG THE WAY: PROVIDE SERVICES 
After shyly exposing a mouth full of rotten teeth from years
of neglect while chasing methamphetamine, one drug-court
participant dejectedly admitted to the judge that she could not
obtain employment. Other defendants lack education and
have limited literacy, much less interview skills or adequate
clothing. Many have destroyed relationships with family and
friends who distrust them after years of abuse and are ill-
equipped to repair the damage. The defendants have neither
the necessary life skills nor adequate support networks to
achieve success.
Successful drug courts fill
holes in the lives of participants
that years of addiction have cre-
ated and provide an array of sup-
port services to aid recovery.
Support services are varied and
often include GED training, job
training and placement, hous-
ing, medical and dental care,
nutritional assistance, recovery
support groups, meditation,
mediation, and conflict-resolution training.
Signpost: Seek Community Support
Excellent drug treatment alone is insufficient without
addressing the issues that contribute to addiction. Judges in all
courts should consider the additional problems that can
weaken a defendant’s resolve and will compromise compliance
with probationary requirements. Defendants who lack a place
to sleep, for example, or cannot feed or clothe their children
will find it difficult to concentrate on recovery and comply
with probation requirements. In jurisdictions that are resource
poor, judges—by virtue of their leadership status and position
in the community—can develop partnerships and links to
access services to improve the success of those under their
supervision. Religious organizations, educational institutions,
community coalitions, medical facilities, and service clubs are
but a few examples of resources that can supplement the miss-
ing pieces that the court system alone is unable to fill. For
example, judges have obtained bikes from police departments
to aid participants with transportation, partnered with com-
munity organizations to facilitate housing placements, and
connected with colleges to provide GED and literacy training.
With a bit of ingenuity and outreach, judges can fill gaps in the
system and locate needed services to improve probationers’
success.
ARRIVE AT YOUR DESTINATION: CONCLUSION
“Behold the turtle. He makes progress only when he
sticks his neck out.”
—James B. Conant
The last 25 years of drug-court practice has proven that
research-based, non-traditional approaches to judging signifi-
cantly improve the life condition of defendants, reduce recidi-
vism, and repair fractured lives. Drug-court practitioners are
fervent about the ability of these programs to address deep-
seated and exceedingly difficult issues of drugs and crime
when other methods have failed. It is not surprising that
judges routinely proclaim their assignments in drug court to be
the most valuable and satisfying of their careers. 
Drug-court judges, not satisfied with the status quo, are
willing to implement innovative methods, are guided by new
research findings, and make programmatic changes as needed.
However, drug-court techniques and concepts are not the
exclusive possessions of these programs and are easily
exportable to traditional courtrooms. Judges in all assignments
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For over a decade, the drug-court model has expanded to
other specialized courts. Veterans’ courts, mental-health
courts, prostitution courts, homeless courts, dependency
courts, community courts, and even co-parenting courts are
founded on many of the same basic therapeutic principles
employed in drug courts. Implementing a new specialized
court is an option, but the critical components of a drug-court
model can be replicated with surprising ease and success in
traditional courtrooms without instituting an entire program.
The options are many, and judges are limited only by their
imaginations. All that judges need to do is to expose their
necks a little.
Jamey Hueston is the founding judge of the Bal-
timore City Drug Treatment Court. She admin-
istered the program for over 20 years and has
hosted hundreds of national and international
visiting judges and others seeking to observe its
operations and adapt them to their respective
jurisdictions. She also founded and chaired the
Maryland Office of Problem-Solving Courts, one of the first
statewide drug-court-oversight offices in the country, for over a
decade and is a pioneer founder of the National Association of
Drug Court Professionals. Judge Hueston lectures and consults
throughout the U.S. and internationally regarding drug courts and
court justice.
Kevin Burke has been a Minneapolis trial judge
since 1984. He established the first drug court
in the state of Minnesota. He served several
terms as chief judge of the Hennepin County
District Court in Minnesota, a 62-judge court,
where he instituted social-science studies exam-
ining—and reforms improving—procedural
fairness. Burke coauthored the American Judges
Association’s white paper on procedural fairness in 2007. Since
then, he and coauthor Kansas Judge Steve Leben have made
invited presentations on procedural fairness to more than 3,000
state and federal judges. He is a recipient of the William Rehnquist
Award. In 2004, the magazine Governing named him Public Offi-
cial of the Year.
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Across
1 Eights, in Madrid
6 Taco Bell topping
11 Banned insecticide, briefly
14 '90s singer Apple
15 Jones of the '69 Mets
16 Be sorry about
17 With 52-Down, judge's bud?
19 Dollar rival





30 Tuna type, on menus
31 Arduous activity
33 Party paper
34 One engaged in public dis-
plays of affection, often
37 Cheeseburger dripping, maybe









49 E, to Morse
50 Arizona health resort destina-
tion
53 It might be liquid or frozen
55 Mount from which Moses
viewed the Promised Land
56 "Are you ___ at me?"
58 With 52-Down, not let a judge
decide?
63 '50s campaign name
64 Garson of "Madame Curie"
65 "___ of One’s Own"
66 Long-snouted fish
67 Dumbbell marking (abbr.)
68 Removable car roofs
Down
1 Not running
2 Fig. with a diameter
3 ___ polloi
4 Bridge bid, for short
5 Aiwa competitor
6 Macbeth, for one
7 '80s TV E.T.
8 Kind of injection
9 Old Cleveland-based gas
company
10 Rare blood type (abbr.)
11 Where a suit may be pressed?
12 To be paid
13 Two-digit card
18 One who might get down in
the mouth?
22 Throughout this document
23 Baseball great Ripken Jr.
24 "Now I get it!"
25 Local judge, e.g. (one would
hope)
26 Auxiliary wager
28 Army cops, briefly
29 "What did I tell you?"
32 Gold digger's strike
33 Icky buildup
ORDERLY PLACE by Victor Fleming
35 West Virginia city
36 Radar screen spot
37 Driver's aid
39 Eight-time NBA All-Star ___
Ming
40 Currently in
41 Tool used in a lumberjack com-
petition
43 ___-Caps (movie candy)
44 ___ Luis Obispo
46 Hand protector
49 Surname on some lawn mowers
51 WWII convoy menace
52 Where a suit may be pressed?
54 APO addressee
55 Worker's rights grp.
56 Korean War fighting plane
57 Alias introducer
59 No. with an area code
60 Overly
61 Alley in a cave
62 Bands on the radio?
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
2016 MIDYEAR MEETING
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO
Drury Plaza Hotel
April 19-22
THE AJA ANNUAL CONFERENCE:  THE BEST JUDICIAL EDUCATION AVAILABLE ANYWHERE
For more information, go to http://amjudges.org/conferences.
2016 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
TORONTO, ONTARIO
Toronto Marriott Eaton Centre
September 25-30
$214 (Canadian) single/double 
(should be under $200 US depending on exchange rate)
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
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NEW BOOKS
ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCI-
ENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE. Crown Pub-
lishing, 2015. 400 pp. ($17.43).
The unseen forces that make our crim-
inal-justice system less fair than we
would like is the topic of the debut book
by law professor Adam Benforado. As an
introductory backdrop, Professor Ben-
forado compares 12th-century ordeals of
water and fire to our current justice sys-
tem. Will our ancestors 900 years from
now look back on our current system
with similar shock? Benforado thinks
they will. Interweaving real cases and
events with research findings from psy-
chology and neuroscience, this book
examines the underlying—often uncon-





stems from a num-
ber of sources,





can lead to criminal behavior, our desire
for retribution, the fallibility of even DNA
evidence, and situational influences on
behavior. Many of the described empiri-
cal findings are the classics from research
on psychology and law (e.g., eyewitness
unreliability, false confessions, and false
memories), but Benforado masterfully
describes them in a way that provides a
compelling argument for change.
Although the book is relatively light on
solutions to the inherent unfairness of
our system, Professor Benforado does
provide some notable suggestions, such
as relying more on technology than
human faculties. Overall, Unfair encour-
ages its readers to take notice of potential







This website is entirely devoted to col-
lecting materials related to procedural
justice. The site focuses primarily on
courts but also includes materials related
to law enforcement.  
Since January 2014, the website has
been posting quarterly summaries (under
the “Resources” tab) of new research,
along with links to books, articles, pre-
sentations, and other materials available
on the web. Several podcasts with
researchers whose work was included in
the quarterly reports can be found at the
Procedural Fairness Blog (www.proced
uralfairnessblog.org) part of the website.
The blog also has suggestions on how to
use video to improve a judge’s perfor-
mance on the bench (www.goo.gl/
906eze) and on specific courtroom
behaviors that promote perceptions of
fairness (www.goo.gl/4VVzSS).
Center for Court Innovation
http://www.courtinnovation.org/topic/
procedural-justice
The Center for Court Innovation has
been another key player in the procedural-
justice movement. The website has links
to research articles as well as interviews
with a number of experts in the field.
Under the “Publications” tab, you’ll find a
recent publication that will be of interest
to most judges: Procedural Justice: Practical
Tips for Courts by Emily Gold LaGratta.
The site also includes an evaluation toolkit
that individual courts can use to gauge
their procedural-justice performance. 
National Center for State Courts
www.ncsc.org
In addition to its contributions to the
ProceduralFairness.org website, the
National Center for State Courts also has
many other useful resources. On its main
website, under the “Information &
Resources” tab, you’ll find materials
related to “Public Trust and Confidence.”
There’s also the Center on Court Access to
Justice for All, found at www.ncsc.org/atj.
That site includes a webinar on proce-
dural fairness and the self-represented lit-
igant, along with materials for a judicial-
engagement curriculum designed to teach
neutral engagement with self-represented
litigants.  In addition, the National Center
offers CourTools, a set of performance-
measurement tools found at www.cour
tools.org. The measures on “Access and
Fairness” target procedural-fairness
issues, and the National Center offers the
courthouse-visitor surveys in both Eng-
lish and Spanish. 
CONFERENCES OF INTEREST
Kern-Medina Seminar on Science and
the Humanities
www.kernmedinaseminar.org 
One of the more interesting educa-
tional programs specifically for judges is
the Kern-Medina Seminar, held each June
on the campus of Princeton University.
This year’s conference is scheduled for
June 9 to 14 and is open to both state and
federal judges in the United States, as well
as judges in other countries. (Canadian
judges have attended.) The seminar is
cosponsored by Princeton University and
the Federal Judicial Center.
Programs cover a broad spectrum,
such as world history, the human
genome, the music of Beethoven, the
European Union, and molecular biology.
Each session includes a question-and-
answer period with the expert presenter.
The cost of the conference is $625 per
attendee, and judges often bring spouses
(for an additional fee).
More information can be obtained 
at the conference website or by contact-
ing retired judge B. Paul Cotter, Jr. 
(tcotter1@verizon.net), who coordinates
the conference.
The Resource Page
g
